

Isaiah T. Montgomery and the Mississippi Constitution: STRATEGY UNDER EXTREME ADVERSITY (Revised to December 12 2016 )  
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## Isaiah T. Montgomery and the Mississippi Constitution: Strategy under Extreme Adversity

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### Introduction

This paper is an outgrowth from the notes used in a roundtable on March 19, 2016. The roundtable was proposed to the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), and approved for its 2016 meeting in Jackson, Mississippi. The roundtable was held in the House of Representatives Chamber in the Old Capitol Museum, and was open without charge to any member of the public.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>. Todd C. Shaw, 2016 President of National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS), and Sekou Franklin, 2016 Program Co-Chair, encouraged and assisted in the scheduling of the roundtable.

Katherine Blount (Director, Mississippi Department of Archives and History), Connie Michael (Facilities Use Coordinator, The Old Capitol Museum, and Trey Roberts (Mississippi Department of Archives and History) assisted in getting the use of the chamber and in presenting information on the Mississippi Museums project. The cost of the chamber was paid by Matthew Holden, Jr, from private income in behalf of the Isaiah T. Montgomery Studies Project.

The chair of the round table was Michael V. Williams, Dean of the Social Science Division Tougaloo College. The other participants were Dorothy Pratt (University of South Carolina), Jeanne Middleton-Hairston (Millsaps College), Byron D'Andra Orey (Jackson State University), and Dr. Ollye Brown Shirley (Jackson, MS).

I has been obliged for private comments, at various stages, from Lynda Lasswell Crist, the late Milburn J. Crowe, Elbert Hilliard, Mack Henry Jones, Vernon Jordan, Dianne M. Pinderhughes, the late Hanes Walton, Jr., and Governor William F. Winter at various stages of his research on Isaiah T. Montgomery.

My spouse, Dorothy H. Holden has been supportive and encouraging over a long time and is particularly to be thanked.

Despite its name, the organization has no racial limits. It is open to all professional political scientists. The organization emerged forty years ago to encourage the study and teaching of political science in the historically black colleges and universities. Most of NCOBPS members are college professors who conduct research and teach about politics, notably about the status of Blacks in politics, both domestic and global. In particular, they are likely to believe that African Americans taken as a group still occupy a subordinated position and wish to know how that came to be and how it can be overcome.

The round table was set up to explore ideas for exploration about reputation in politics, with particular attention to Isaiah T. Montgomery (1847-1924), the sole African American delegate in the 1890 Constitutional Convention.<sup>2</sup> Isaiah T. Montgomery was a man both of unusual personal history and of magnitude.

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Obviously, no one except I is responsible for form or content.

<sup>2</sup> . Montgomery was, co-founder of Mound Bayou, Mississippi, a predominantly African American town in Bolivar County, in the Mississippi Delta. Mound Bayou itself is relevant, but not the principal element in this paper.

The strongest scholarly work on the development of Mound Bayou is Janet Sharp Hermann, In Pursuit of a Dream, Berkeley? University of California Press, 196? Two more specialized and semi-popular books are by a Canadian author and native of Mound Bayou, LaFlorya Gauthier, Isaiah T. Montgomery: A Biography, Baltimore: PublishAmerica LLP, 2013; and Tulia Brown Hamilton, Up from Canaan: The African American Journey from Mound Bayou to St. Louis, (*missouri lives series*) St. Louis: PenUltimate Press, 2011.

Matthew Holden, Jr., "MatthewGeorge Will, Mel Reynolds, and Mound Bayou" is one of several working papers on Mound Bayou and is available by request to the author at [matthewpolsci@aol.com](mailto:matthewpolsci@aol.com).

. With that in mind, we will knit together as well as possible material on (i) Montgomery himself as person and political actor, (ii) the situation, (iii) the strategy, (iv) the results, and (v) arguable lessons to be learned or trial run hypotheses to be derived about a theory of political strategy of African Americans during the counter-emancipation of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and the first third of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, political strategy in general.<sup>3</sup>

Politics as Walton Hamilton wrote “the usages and traditions, the arrangements and policies by which (human beings) are governed . . . and which (humans) attempt to shape destiny.”<sup>4</sup>

Political scientists have the duty to develop knowledge of “the skill of making and maintaining commonwealths [. . .].” That skill consisted, according to the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, whom one cites here for all the fact that he is generally disapproved, “in certain rules . . . which neither poor men have had the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity or the method to find out.”<sup>5</sup>

One of the essential rules is to understand objectively political reputation.<sup>6</sup> The central problem is about the about a distinctive man of color in Mississippi, is how white people have shaped a demand for white supremacy, how persons of African ancestry have coped with that demand, how that distinctive man dealt with the idea of strategy in face of the demand for white supremacy, and about what the important questions and hypotheses thus are for analytical political science on a grander human scale.<sup>7</sup>

The Old Capitol has heard many speeches, both in the 1890 Convention and many other occasions, in advocacy of white supremacy. White supremacy meant the absolute veto of equality in all walks of life – public and private – between white and Black. White people, with very rare exceptions, were have felt committed to, or been compelled

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<sup>3</sup> . If one had time, and did not have so many other and overdue obligations, one might reformulate this paper in the mode summarized in this sentence, which is much influenced by the particular mode of decision-making analysis once framed by Richard C. Snyder and others.

<sup>4</sup> . Walton Hamilton, Politics of Industry, New York: W.W.Norton, 1957, 6.

<sup>5</sup> . Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Edited by Michael Oakeshott), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960, 136.

<sup>6</sup> .  
<sup>7</sup>

to follow this rule by the destructive loss of reputation and privileges.<sup>8</sup>

Any theory of group behavior must implicitly, if not always explicitly, impose rules that will keep people within the group, keep other people out the group, and forbid insiders from bringing in outsiders. Oliver W. Hill, Sr., said “To help ensure compliance from other members of the white community, (the segregationists) were quick to resort to imposing the label ‘Nigger Lover’ upon anyone who failed to follow their practices.” Many who might be so labeled were “fearful that not only they but also their spouses and children would be ostracized they took a stand in favor of equal rights for all people regardless of color.” ( ).

Sidney R. Redmond, a native of Jackson, Mississippi, and himself a Harvard-educated St. Louis lawyer, asserted in an interview in 1970 “There are a lot of white people of good will (who) would like to do things, but the majority of the whites are harder on white people who are fair with Negroes than they are on Negroes.”

The white supremacy norm meant that both the white person or institution, and the Black person or institution, was forbidden to depart from the norm without paying a price that would usually be found too high. Since the last Black legislators departed the old Capitol, the chambers heard very few speeches in behalf of white-black peacemaking. In 1890, the Constitutional Convention—filled with Davis’s followers and former subordinates – heard one such speech by Isaiah T. Montgomery.

Dr. L. C. Dorsey, once a faculty member at Mississippi Valley State University, said that young people of the 21<sup>st</sup> century should be taught of the conditions with which the Isaiah T. Montgomery generation had to live.<sup>9</sup> Aaron Wildavsky, a political scientist of magnitude and a sustained advocate of political science as a discipline,<sup>10</sup> once

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<sup>8</sup> . (Interview, op. cit., with Sidney R. Redmond, Oral History T-0025, Interviewed by Dr. Richard Resh and Franklin Rother, Black Community Leaders Project, July 6. 1970, Transcript. [Oral History Collection \(S0829\)](#), [The State Historical Society of Missouri.](#), [shsresearch@umsystem.edu](mailto:shsresearch@umsystem.edu).)

<sup>9</sup> .  
<http://www.jacksonadvocateonline.com/legacy-of-l-c-dorsey-is-unparalleled-in-the-war-on-poverty-in-mississippi/>

<sup>10</sup> . Wildavsky was President of the American Political Science Association in

generically put the question of “what shall we teach the young?” The young of any generation –Black, white, or any other group, and current or past– have never been taught that speech, its circumstances, or its consequences.

As it happens, most of those who make it their business to study seriously the politics of the United States do go into much depth on Mississippi, and those have not into much depth on the making of the Mississippi Constitution or the presence of Isaiah T. Montgomery.

### Isaiah T. Montgomery.

The political scientist who studies reputation, as a general phenomenon, should also be driven intellectually is to explore what African Americans of Isaiah T. Montgomery’s time, and for two generations after said of him, and how we should evaluate the best evidence we can get in favor of, and in opposition to, what is said.<sup>11</sup>

Isaiah T. Montgomery was born an enslaved person, the son of an enslaved father, Benjamin T. Montgomery. He was a virtual genius, son of a virtual genius. From the time he was ten he was made to be the personal servant of Joseph Emory Davis.<sup>12</sup> An

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1985-86, at which time I was by his appointment Program Chair of Association.

Wildavsky was a colleague of the political science generation that took its doctorates in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He was a man of endless interests, and in contrast to most of his generation apparently, afraid of virtually no subject. He was more conservative perhaps than many political scientists of his time, but also one of the strongest to articulate that white people and Black people have to learn to live in the same space.

Holden’s respect for Wildavsky in this regard is reflected in “The Competence of Political Science: ‘Progress in Political Research’ Revisited,” American Political Science Review96:1 (January 2000), 1-19.

Michael B. Preston and I once agreed, in conversation, that Wildavsky was one of the strongest faculty supporters of African American graduate students at the University of California.

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. In some other setting, it will be desirable to examine other accounts, especially Mississippi accounts, as well as accounts from mainline academic historians, of Montgomery as they have changed over time.

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. Rayford W. Logan, “Montgomery, Isaiah Thornton,” in Rayford W. Logan and

important person with a lot correspondence had to have someone copy the same letter to as many people as should receive it. Young Isaiah had the complete confidence of Joseph Emory Davis, and was trained a copyist back in the days when the internet did not exist as a messenger, office and clerk.

Montgomery also worked for Jefferson Davis in the brief periods when he was home from his travels. As it happens, this was in the four years between the Dred Scott decision and February 11, 1861, when Jefferson Davis went off to become Confederate President. Isaiah was, by his own report, in the escort that took Jefferson Davis to the landing dock.<sup>13</sup>

Whatever the Davises wrote he copied, whatever correspondence they received, he read and filed, whatever conversations they had, he heard. He was then three months shy of being 14 years old. Isaiah was sent with his family, under the auspices of Admiral David D. Porter, to live and work at Cincinnati during the time of the Vicksburg campaign.

Those clerical connections to one of the largest and richest slaveholders in Mississippi before the Civil War, to the brother who became President of the Confederacy, and the Union naval commander themselves constituted first steps in a political education before the age of sixteen. In 2016, it would be called internship. While he had almost no formal schooling beyond tutelage at home, we may guess that he was far better educated than most members of the convention to which he was elected.

Nearly thirty years after the young boy Montgomery escorted Davis on his route to the Confederate Presidency, the adult Montgomery delivered what was probably the most far-reaching, future-minded speech.

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Michael R. Winston (eds.), Dictionary of American Negro Biography New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1982, 445-446. Logan and Winston (Eds.), op. cit. is the authoritative 20<sup>th</sup> century biographical dictionary that takes intellectual precedence over a number of earlier biographical compilations (many cited in Logan and Winston, vii-viii), often intended as positive contributions to African American collective psychiatry.

Also, Robert C. Smith, Encyclopedia of African American Politics etc.

<sup>13</sup> . From his own accounts, and from those of others, it is hard to know exactly who went with Davis to the steamship landing.

When the first national monument was created at Lincoln's birthplace in Kentucky, with President Theodore Roosevelt and Union and Confederate commanders, Montgomery was chosen to place a copy of the Emancipation Proclamation in the cornerstone.<sup>14</sup>

Yet in our own time, Isaiah T. Montgomery is the subject of a compromised reputation. Charles Kenyatta Ross quoted a strong civil rights leader on the Gulf Coast "Montgomery sold us out."<sup>15</sup> The quoted civil rights leader expressed an attitude similar to that of the litterateur J. Saunders Redding.<sup>16</sup> John Hope Franklin said almost the same thing in almost the same words.<sup>17</sup> Beyond that, even worse things have been said, all the way to "Judas."

### Collective Psychiatry or Rational Strategy?

For such study, political scientists – whether oriented to Blacks as a group or not – need to think about politics as collective psychiatry and politics as rational strategy for pragmatic group action.

Collective psychiatry helps individuals express themselves as members of a group, and about how they feel about the members of the other group.<sup>18</sup> Human beings are given to incessant surges of emotion, sometimes tidal in their strength, which they sometimes may seek to mask and which they sometimes make no effort to handle rationally.

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<sup>14</sup> . Isaiah T. Montgomery and Emancipation: A Working Paper, adapted from note in preparation for the 2012 Wepner Symposium on the Lincoln Legacy and Contemporary Scholarship, University of Illinois at Springfield. ([www.uis/.edu/wepner](http://www.uis/.edu/wepner).)

<sup>15</sup> . This was said to I in June 2004, when Holden was visiting at the University of Mississippi. Whatever may have been Ross's view, this was the view he attributed to a highly regarded and well known Mississippi civil rights leader.

<sup>16</sup> . J. Saunders Redding,

<sup>17</sup> . The reader is asked to accept Matthew Holden's memory for which has no verification. This was in a car ride from a meeting of the Committee on Policy for Racial Justice in the 1980s. Holden's files of those committee meetings are not now available, but the conversation occurred after a meeting at Wingspread.

<sup>18</sup> .

Collective psychiatry is present in many populations, as it was in the Mississippi Delta white recitations of the travails that they perceive themselves as having undergone during the Civil War,<sup>19</sup> or in other questions as to whether the Confederate battle flag should still be publicly venerated.

As a different illustration, note the Afrikaans-speaking white population of South Africa. In 1996, F. W. deKlerk suggested to Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands a museum of Boer war, so that she should see for herself how the British, “in their concentration camps, had treated Afrikaners similarly to the way the Nazis had treated their victims.” The Queen was offended, deKlerk was startled by her being offended, and Judge Richard Goldstone had to offer a mollifying explanation that he himself characterized as inadequate.<sup>20</sup>

Collective psychiatry is, in short, not a behavior of Blacks alone. However, it is one group response, and the evaluation of Isaiah T. Montgomery, or any other claimant to leadership, depends on whether collective psychiatric needs are satisfied. If collective psychiatry is one group response, an alternative model is that of pragmatic strategy.

William M. McGovern, a professor of political science at Northwestern in the 1950s, distinctively summarized: tactics is how to win a battle, strategy is how win a war, grand strategy is how to choose a war so that winning it will leave you better off than if you had not fought. In international relations, where the collective body is the “nation,” strategy is the rational determination of . . . vital interests, the things essential to its security, its fundamental purposes in its relations with other nations, and its priorities with respect to goals.”<sup>21</sup>

## Political Choices and Reputations

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<sup>19</sup> . Florence Warfield Sillers (compiler, ), Wirt A. Williams, History of Bolivar County, Mississippi, Spartanburg, S. C., 1976, (editor), and Evelyn Hammett (indexer), various accounts cited.

<sup>20</sup> Richard J. Goldstone, For Humanity: Reflections of a War Crimes Investigator, with a Foreword by Sandra Day O’Connor, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, 61-62.

<sup>21</sup> . Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, “Reflections on Strategy in the Present and the Future,” in Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, 869.

From the point of view of view of the analytical needs of the discipline of political science, there is a strong need for the study of reputation. Reputation is political currency and gains credence only if it is circulated by people who are believed. Reputation is powerful even when people do not know the substance of what is disputed. Action is what a person does. Reputation is what others make of what the person does. Reputation is powerful even when people do not know the substance of what is disputed.

For all its importance in the real world of politics, reputation as independent variable or a means of achieve action, and reputation as dependent variable or a consequence of action. This is true of individuals' reputations, of the reputations of particular groups, and of the reputations of organizations, institutions, countries, and other aggregations.

Action is what a person does. Reputation is what others make of what the person does. Reputation is powerful even when people do not know the substance of what is disputed. "Bad reputation" makes it hard to study anything unless the presumption is that the study will also show that the person, institution, or situation is bad.

Common sense examples start.

When I was a small boy, the Delta culture taught the avoidance of "bad company." My grandmother said, "Son, if you play with a puppy, he'll lick your mouth." Wherever else the Old Testament is part of cultural education, people know Exodus 10:1, the scripture says that "dead flies cause the ointment of the apothecary to send forth stinking savor, so doth a little folly him that is in reputation for wisdom and honor."

In more secular terms, Baroness Thatcher, after a long and successful career, said "Once a politician is given a public image by the media, it is almost impossible for him to shed it." Thatcher continued that "At every important stage of his career, it steps between him and the public so that people see and hear not the man himself but the invented personality to which he has been reduced."

In the Bolshevik Revolution, which is recent months has received a good time of television historical treatment, the three main figures were Nikolai Lenin, Joseph Stalin and Leon Trotsky. Lenin died, Stalin took over, and Trotsky was forced into exile and killed in Mexico. In the Euro-American intellectual world, the admirers of the new

Soviet Union were strong The result was that when Isaac Deutscher wrote a three volume study of Trotsky he said that one of his tasks had been to clear away the load of dead dogs piled atop Trotsky's reputation.

Countries and states, cities, towns and counties, and institutions –governmental and otherwise– also acquire reputations. The reputation of Mississippi has grown from the demands that the interests bearing that name have from the first imposed on the United States.

The interests that controlled the design of the Mississippi Territory secured in 1808 Congressional legislation the provision that in the Mississippi Territory only white males were permitted to vote for representatives to the general assembly. The interests that dominated Mississippi were always committed to Black exclusion in state and local government. When Mississippi was admitted to statehood, this principle of white supremacy remained in force,

In contrast, Tennessee allowed free Black voting at least until 1834 and North Carolina allowed free Black voting until 1835.<sup>22</sup> In no part of the United States has white rule been harsher. Nor is there any part of the United States in which black submission and acquiescence has been more patent. The interests that dominated Mississippi were always committed to chattel slavery. This was even in contrast to the interests that Virginia had for a time legally and socially allowed debate in favor of emancipation. Those interests even allowed an early Virginia economist to put forth a theory of living without slavery.

The interests that dominated the creation of Mississippi and its subsequent governance went along, under pressure of circumstances, the fact that that chattel slavery was outlawed in the Federal Constitution. But those interested refused assent to that formal approval. Instead, those interests mounted a counter-attack and counter-emancipation.

## COUNTER-ATTACK AND COUNTER-EMANCIPATION

When an initial defeat occurs, the losing side will retreat, regroup, or seek

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. Charles H. Wesley, "Negro Suffrage in the Period of Constitution-Making, 1787-1865," The Journal of Negro History, 32: 2 (April, 1947), 143-168.

to escape altogether, sometimes surrender, and in relatively rare circumstances come to reciprocal terms of living with the other. But in the end they will continue to reassert their position and attempt to reverse the outcome.<sup>23</sup>

Counter-attack is to be expected in domestic politics as much as military engagement. In the relation of any two groups, particularly those defined as “races,” domination and subordination are at stake, then the allowance of latitude for co-operation with the other is not possible.

In the discipline of political science, there is not yet a contemporary examination of how the process of counter-attack, as it existed in the former Confederacy, was conducted. Chattel slavery had officially ended, but the seceded states had not yet become fully integrated into the national polity and the real condition of the Black people was the subject of everyday dispute.<sup>24</sup>

In order to describe what happened in the status relationship of white and Black, after the Civil War, I choose the term “counter-emancipation.”<sup>25</sup> President Lincoln was urged to consider abandoning emancipation as a means to bring the Civil War to an end.

There was always, both within one wing of the Lincoln coalition and amongst Democrats, some question of how far emancipation would be installed fully in the political agreement of the constitution. But President Lincoln absolutely refused the equivocation.<sup>26</sup> The Thirteenth Amendment (outlawing slavery) was brought in 1865,

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<sup>23</sup> . I, “Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Role of Institutions,” in R. A.W. Rhoades, Bert A. Rockman, and Sarah A. Binder (eds.),

<sup>24</sup> . Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1889 Part One A, (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States), New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

<sup>25</sup> . I has previously introduced this term “**counter-emancipation**”--in programs presented under the auspices of the 5<sup>th</sup> Wepner Symposium on the Legacy of Abraham Lincoln and Contemporary Political Science, University of Illinois at Springfield, 2015; the Abraham Lincoln Association, Annual Meeting, 2015; and the Teachers’ Workshop, Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and Museum, 2015. He is obliged for the cooperation of faculty who had attended these programs, and especially for inquiries by Susan Koch, and contributions by David Bateman.

<sup>26</sup> . How Wars End, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, Chapter Eight, “The American Civil War.”

initiated while Lincoln was alive, but effective after he was dead, the Fourteenth Amendment effective in 1868, and the Fifteenth Amendment prohibiting the denial or abridgment of the right vote was formally in effect by 1870.

But there was a constant effort to negate and undermine practice, in a way that would be more fully grasped if the implementation literature from the 1960s were taken into account and applied retrospectively.<sup>27</sup> The dominant policy of Mississippi leadership was to resist compliance with Federal policy and to search anew for white supremacy. They sought, and over a period of years into the 20<sup>th</sup> century, achieved counter-emancipation.

Contemporary political scientists may find expressions of white supremacy concepts written by local leaders who lived and worked precisely in the area in which Montgomery also lived and worked at the time that the Constitutional Convention was being held.<sup>28</sup>

The professed norms of peaceful social change obviously were not present in the Mississippi after 1865. The resources out of which power is created are three: information, money and its surrogates, and force.<sup>29</sup>

Force was the key in the situation – the “condition” as L. C. Dorsey refers to it<sup>30</sup> –with which Isaiah T. Montgomery came to be a political actor. Charles E. Merriam, a Columbia-trained scholar, published of nothing expressly of the counter-emancipation. But in the 1920s he set before the discipline the idea that there should be deeper study of force and its opposites, passive resistance and non-cooperation.<sup>31</sup> James W. Garner, a

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<sup>27</sup>. Aaron B. Wildavsky and Jeffrey Pressman, ; Frank J. Thompson,

<sup>28</sup>. Florence Warfield Sillers (compiler, ), Wirt A. Williams, History of Bolivar County, Mississippi, Spartanburg, S. C., 1976, (editor), and Evelyn Hammett (indexer).

<sup>29</sup>. I will further develop this is a broad generic theme covering all time and space. This is a long-delayed manuscript on the practice of power, based on the 2001 Rothbaum Lecture on Representative Government at the University of Oklahoma.

<sup>30</sup>. Dorsey as cited at p. above.

<sup>31</sup>. Charles E. Merriam, “Progress in Political Research,” American Political Science Review

Mississippian who was another Columbia scholar of the same generation,<sup>32</sup> referred to three words, “Winchester rifle politics” in the attainment of counter-emancipation. The people who could enforce their participation by killing their adversaries won the debates.<sup>33</sup> Fire power was always in the hands of those whites least open to compromise.<sup>34</sup> This is manifest the killing rates to which African Americans were subject, a matter to which some few contemporary historians—and even fewer political scientists—have yet seemed attentive.

There was a Radical grand Republican strategy, enunciated by George S. Boutwell. “We know that the Negro is in favor of (this government’s) existence, and therefore, for all the purposes of voting, whether he can read and write or not, he is a safe depository of power; and therefore I am in favor of allowing him to vote, without going into an inquiry whether he can read and write, because his power at the ballot box is now essential to us, just exactly as his power in the field with the bayonet was essential to us during the war.”<sup>35</sup>

Gene Dattel, a transplanted Mississippian who has recently written on the subject of cotton,<sup>36</sup> is decidedly critical of Boutwell. He discusses Boutwell in

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<sup>32</sup> . Garner managed to achieve the respect of DuBois, Black Reconstruction, 711. It is possible that DuBois, faced with the extreme anti-Black contempt or hostility of most scholarship of the time, with no toleration of African Americans may have underplayed Garner’s acceptance of the emancipation policies. Garner at least entered an extensive debate via letter with Adelbert Ames, as recounted in Lemann, though Ames could never get Garner to agree that the policy at the time was right.

<sup>33</sup> . Matthew Holden, Jr., Force, Federalism, and the Constitutional System,” Unpublished Manuscript Paper for Discussion in Department Colloquium, Department of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, February 16, 1994, Revised to 2010. Available by request. [MatthewHPolSci@aol.com](mailto:MatthewHPolSci@aol.com).

<sup>34</sup> . Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction, New York 1971.

<sup>35</sup> . George Boutwell, Speeches and Papers Relating to the Rebellion and the Overthrow of Slavery, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1867, 394-395, 397.

<sup>36</sup> . Cotton and Race in the Making of America: The Human Costs of Economic

the mode other Northerners who supported Black rights for “motives (that) were hardly noble.” Boutwell wished, if Dattel is correct, Black rights to be maintained and prosperity attained in the South in order not to force a great migration into the labor markets of the industrial North.

Dattel’s analysis of the way things do work, primarily according to his theories of the necessities of industry, offers some explanation of what has since happened in the urban North.<sup>37</sup> It offers no conception of what could, or should, have been done that would have produced a better result and, in the end, is a restatement of pain and of hopelessness in the face of industrial technology.<sup>38</sup>

The Republicans failed, never being long sustained by immediate tactical decisions nor by midde-term strategy.<sup>39</sup> There was never a Democratic strategy of any form of Black inclusion. The Democratic strategy was “keep the blacks out of power and under control,” or “achieve and maintain white supremacy.” The Democrats succeeded. The Republican failure and the Democratic success turned emancipation into counter-emancipation.

#### Time in Which Montgomery’s Choices Were Made: Emancipation and Counter-Emancipation

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Power, London: Ivan R. Dee, 2009, 235. We do not have space and data to examine the politics of the industry (as developed in Hamilton The Politics of Industry, previously cited) as that concept might be applied to cotton, but it is worth further reflection since cotton was central to the life lived in Bolivar County.

<sup>37</sup>

. Dattel, op.cit., 363-365.

<sup>38</sup> . From the point of view of this paper, if normative judgments should be made about what should have been done in the late 1860s and early 1870s, when Boutwell was active, the question is what he should have done, instead if what he did.

<sup>39</sup> . From the viewpoint of political science, there is the recurrent question of interpreting the relation between the political party and the ethnic group. Matthew Holden, Jr., “Party Politics and Ethnic Politics,” in Clyde J. Wingfield (Ed.), Political Science: Some New Perspectives, Texas Western Press, The University of Texas at El Paso, 1966, 117-127.

Whenever a group in power shall have encountered defeat, those who have won must know that counter-attack will come.<sup>40</sup> Emancipation in Mississippi, and elsewhere in the former Confederacy, was followed by the counter-attack or the campaign of counter-emancipation that went on into the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>41</sup>

<sup>42</sup> The problem of counter-attack is often manifest in the remaking of a constitution. A constitution is not some bundle of other-worldly ideals. It is a political agreement amongst those capable of exerting power about the terms on which they will deal with each other, whom else they will admit and on what terms, and whom they will treat as mere resources, but otherwise not admissible all.<sup>43</sup>

In all these matters, political scientists (and historians) need to work with sense of time. For the first four years after the Civil War ended legal slavery, the Mississippi leadership tried to reestablish control without chattel slavery. In late 1865, the state legislature met again and adopted the first of the Black Codes for Mississippi. This was in the same year that states in the North began to adopt the Thirteenth Amendment, and put their own sanction of emancipation into place by repealing their own previously existing Black Codes. Illinois, by no means a state tolerant of Blacks, was the first to

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. I, "Exclusion, Inclusion, and Political Institutions," in R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rickman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 163-190.

<sup>41</sup> . David Bateman, Paper Presented at the 5<sup>th</sup> Wepner Symposium on the Lincoln Legacy and Contemporary Scholarship, University of Illinois at Springfield, June 25, 2016

<sup>42</sup> . **David Brian Robertson, The Constitution: America's Destiny**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Calvin Jillson, Constitution-Making: Conflict and Consensus in the 1787 Convention, xxxx; and Peter M. Shane, "Analyzing Constitutions," in in R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, 191-216.)

<sup>43</sup> . As another analytical problem that emerges, it may be plausible—with the Mississippi bi-centennial emerging—to argue that Mississippi has never had a "constitution" in which all parts of population were substantially represented without coercion. MH.

ratify the Thirteenth Amendment.<sup>44</sup>

Against that, we need to consider Mississippi practice in same year when Mississippi refused to give formal assent to the Thirteenth Amendment. The Federal Government, with the Army as its principal instrument in the field, faced the same problem always to be found after military conquest. After the military victory is attained, what is to be done?<sup>45</sup>

Charles Fairman, borrowing from a Mississippi writer of the 1860s, summarizes:

The Negro's place was made clear: he was to be a laborer, chiefly a plantation laborer, bound by the year; his wage would, in practice, be set by the employers; to be without employment would lead to severe sanctions. It was not to be contemplated that the Negro would progress, for the roads were barred. No public education was provided. Poor relief was a charge only upon the Negroes.<sup>46</sup>

This was a policy for counter-emancipation.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> . I, Address, Illinois State Senate, cited in "150 Years Ago: The Illinois General Assembly Remembers the 18<sup>th</sup> Illinois General Assembly. (February 1 and February 7, 1865)."

<sup>45</sup> . Matthew Holden, Jr., "After Victory, What?," Unpublished paper written first in the days of the United States' attack upon Iraq as it was then ruled by Saddam Hussein.

<sup>46</sup> . Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864-1888 Part One A, (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States), New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, ..

<sup>47</sup>

. Counter-Emancipation: Republican Failure and Democratic Success from the Civil War to the Doorsteps of Our Own Time, Adapted from material prepared for Teachers Workshop on Lincoln, Race, and Slavery jointly sponsored the Illinois State Board of Education and Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and Museum, October 24-26, 2014. The same basic concept of counter-emancipation has been presented in various forms as the keynote address of the Abraham Lincoln

In the consideration of Isaiah T. Montgomery, three geographical areas of the state were especially significant, Warren County, Issaquena County, and Bolivar County.

County was the situs of the severe conflict between the Union Army and local white leadership, and between local white factions and local Black factions.<sup>48</sup> Warren County, Mississippi, the territory that included Davis Bend and, preeminently, Vicksburg. After Grant's victory, Vicksburg was the military governmental center.

Property owners who had always been there, and some who came to get rich, engaged in fights with the Union Army and Freedmen's Bureau officials. William H. McCardle, newspaper editor, was one of these whose memory is preserved in constitutional law as Ex parte McCardle.<sup>49</sup> McCardle was a member of the Democratic network who, pro-secession or Union, once the physical war was over vigorously fought to maintain white power.<sup>50</sup>

William C. Harris said "In a biting editorial of November 6, 1867, entitled 'The Scoundrelism of Satraps,' McCardle referred to the district commanders in the South, [General Edward O. C.] Ord included, as 'blasphemous, cowardly and abandoned villains, who, instead of wearing shoulder straps and ruling millions of people, should have their heads shaved, their ears cropped, their foreheads branded, and their precious persons lodged in a penitentiary.'"

Two days later, "This editorial, along with other outbursts . . . resulted in his arrest and confinement by order of General Ord (on charges of ) impeding

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Association, 2015; the Garfield Presidential Scholars Program, October 2014; and the Springfield Bar Association Abraham Lincoln Presidential Funeral Program, April 2015; and the 5<sup>th</sup> Wepner Symposium, University of Illinois at Springfield, June 2015. Cooperation of all sponsors, notably the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and Museum; and the University of Illinois at Springfield is acknowledged.

<sup>48</sup> . Christopher Waldrep, "Black Access to Law in Reconstruction: The Case of Warren County, Mississippi—Freedom: Politics," Chicago-Kent Law Review 70" 2 (Symposium on the Law of Freedom Part I: Article 7, December 1994.

<sup>49</sup> .

<sup>50</sup> .

reconstruction, libeling individuals, and disturbing the public peace by inciting people to riot and even insurrection.<sup>51</sup> Among the many neglected features of political science and history, one is that there is no recitation or published compilation of what McCardle said, how it came to offend the general in command, or where it fit into the network of anti-Union and anti-emancipation people who carried on the resistance in Warren County at the time.<sup>52</sup>

Not all historical research is for praise or denunciation, as military history should show us. Political scientists, particularly with the values likely to be asserted by members of the NOBPS, would perform a service by reviewing files to show in detail what McCardle did and to make those files available for a 21<sup>st</sup> century audience.

Jeremiah S. Black, former Attorney General during the Buchanan Administration, was one the leaders of the Democratic lawyers, including Northerners who had been opposed to secession, but also argued there was no constitutional basis to coerce states, joined in taking the military to court.

Congress repealed the statute allowing the appeal, and on but the Supreme Court denied having jurisdiction to hear the appeal. From the libertarian standard known to political scientists who follow law, little is more important as a test of power than the habeas corpus. Freedom of speech is very little value if someone can put you in jail when they do not like what you say.

But twenty-first century political scientists also need to understand one of the aims of the Jeremiah Black approach was to use the McCardle litigation to achieve a broad Supreme rejection of Congressional power to carry out Reconstruction.<sup>53</sup>

In 1869, with Radical Republicans still strategically powerful in Congress and Grant's becoming President, Mississippi had to accept the new state Constitution that provided for equality of white and black. The 1869 constitution mandated full Black

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<sup>51</sup> . Harris, The Day of the Carpetbagger, 16.

<sup>52</sup> . I discovered, by the courtesy of the Old Court House Museum, Vicksburg, Mississippi, that its library was once owned by William McCardle, but made that discovery too late to see if its material shows what political scientists need to know for present purposes.

<sup>53</sup> . Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion

membership and rules that included Black voting and office holding. How long did this last? It lasted at best six years. In these six years after 1869, there was a time when white men who wanted to win had to secure black votes in the state government.

For the next fifteen years, there was a series of counter-attacks until the new constitutional convention was suddenly pushed through in 1890. Warren

In 1872, three years after the 1869 constitution, Isaiah's young sister, Mary Virginia, kept a diary, some fragments of which have been published.<sup>54</sup> Among other things, she referred to Isaac D. Shadd, a newcomer from the North, who was a bookkeeper in Montgomery & Sons, the firm set up by Benjamin Thornton Montgomery and his two sons. Mary Virginia Montgomery did enter in her diary that he came and brought news of legislation.<sup>55</sup> Wharton once slightly mentions "a Negro from Warren County, I. D. Shadd, soon became the none-too-competent speaker of the House."<sup>56</sup>

Mary Virginia referred to her own excitement at the "Public Meetings" held to choose delegates to the county Republican convention.<sup>57</sup> In September 1872, there was a Republican campaign meeting,<sup>58</sup> and in October there was another, this time addressed by Sheriff Peter Crosby.<sup>59</sup> When the votes recorded, there were 442 for Grant and Wilson and 3 for Horace Greeley.<sup>60</sup>

But the national campaign was in parallel to a county-level fight by white contenders to assert, or regain, control of the offices at the county level. The defenders of the Confederacy lost the military battle but they soon were back in great force electorally, in public relations, and in illegal force. Some were pro-white "carpetbaggers." "Carpetbaggers" are usually identified with "radical" and pro-Black politics.

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<sup>54</sup> . Dorothy B. Sterling, We Are Your Sisters,

<sup>55</sup> . Ibid. 468.

<sup>56</sup>

. Wharton, 176. Shadd was the brother of Mary Ann Shadd, who has received a fair amount of attention in 21<sup>st</sup> century feminist writing.

<sup>57</sup>

. Sterling, 467.

<sup>58</sup>

. Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>

. Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>

. Ibid.

But Vicksburg was the locale of one Charles Furlong, a Union Army officer from Ireland, who made his new departure in Warren County. He became associated himself with one side and then another, was appointed sheriff and then removed by Governor James L. Alcorn, created his own local machine with Black followers, was displaced by an internal Black revolt<sup>61</sup> and then state senator.<sup>62</sup> Furlong moved to New York where he lived until 1907. But before he departed Mississippi one of his last political acts was his speech in the State Senate advocating the conviction and removal of Lieutenant Governor A. K. Davis.<sup>63</sup>

Among the Black leaders was a thirty-year-old man –according to Waldrum—originally from Clarke County.<sup>64</sup> This was Peter Crosby. One of his cohorts was the aforementioned Isaac D. Shadd. At the Republicans' 1873 summer convention blacks dominated the proceedings. Crosby was chosen sheriff. They also chose blacks as chancery and circuit clerks.<sup>65</sup> Whites remained as prosecutor and judge.

If the white people did not control the county offices, they did gain control of the city government, which probably was an advantage as it gave them opportunity to legalize force by city marshals.

By the summer of 1874 rival black and white militias paraded the streets of Vicksburg.<sup>66</sup> “Inflamed by the anti-Republican Crosby tirades of the young editors of the Vicksburger and old-pro McCardle of the Herald, the ‘People’s’ or ‘White Man’s’ party

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<sup>61</sup>

. Nicholas Lemann, Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006.

<sup>62</sup>

. William C. Harris, The Day of the Carpetbagger: Republican Reconstruction in Mississippi, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979. Furlong’s speech in favor of the impeachment of A. K. Davis, Friday, December 18, 1874.

<sup>63</sup> . Virtually all writers seem to assume that A. K. Davis was guilty of the offenses charged, but no assembly and analysis of evidence has yet appeared in any scholarship of which I has become aware.

<sup>64</sup>

. Waldrep, 1979,

<sup>65</sup>

. Vicksburg Herald, November 5, 1873.

<sup>66</sup>

. Waldrep,

instituted a campaign of intimidation, martial display, and economic coercion.”<sup>67</sup>

Later in the same year, a white group was able to coerce resignation from Sheriff Crosby. As one might expect under such conditions, Crosby hurried to Jackson to consult Governor Adelbert Ames. All that Ames did was to advise him was to return to Warren County and raise his own posse comitatus. Such advice did him little good. The white militias were out in force. Harris wrote: “Having routed the blacks in Vicksburg, armed whites vengefully swept the county, attacking suspected insurgents.”<sup>68</sup> They killed convincingly. “When the racial excitement had run its course perhaps as many as three hundred blacks lay dead, whereas only two whites were killed.”<sup>69</sup> Harris says that “planters... in a deliberate attempt to conceal the number of black casualties from their tenants lest labor relations suffer, reported to the press that only twenty five had died.”<sup>70</sup>

Subsequently, the U.S. Army returned Crosby to office, but six months after the Army had restored Crosby to office, others described Warren County as being in a state of anarchy. The scale of the killings is understated in nearly all American literature on the counter-emancipation. If political scientists went back and looked at the reported Warren County experience, they would discover that the killings were massacres.

Start with the number twenty five in Warren County in 1874. That was the low number reported. Arithmetically, this is approximately one in every 840 people. Apply that ratio to New York City. If the 9/11 attacks had killed people on the scale of about 1:840 for the whole city, then the result would have been about 7500 persons. If the killing rate indicated by Harris’s low number had been attained on 9/11,

. If the killing rate indicated by the use of Harris’s high number had been operative, then the al-Qaeda terrorists they

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<sup>67</sup> . William C. Harris, *op. cit.*, 635.

<sup>68</sup> . *Ibid.* 646, n. 61 and 647, n. 61 and 63.

<sup>69</sup>

. Harris, 648, n. 64.

<sup>70</sup> . *Ibid.*

This season of combat was also an impeachment season. Thomas Cardozo was impeached on various charges of financial maladministration. A. K. Davis had already been impeached and removed on charges of having accepted a bribe. Whether he was fairly accused or framed could be a question, as in any impeachment. John R. Lynch, speaking in the House of Representatives, says that the grand jury in Noxubee County, from which the lieutenant governor came, had investigated the matter. “This grand jury, composed of a majority of Democrats, made a report to the court that all parties were innocent.”<sup>71</sup> The new legislature, elected subsequently, accordingly impeached and removed him.

The end result was that when Ames resigned, the lieutenant governorship being vacant, the Democratic Senate president took over as acting governor. It is even plausible that the Democrats might have timed the impeachments to be sure that the governorship would fall to a Democrat if Ames resigned. Democratic rule was returned. Post-Confederate literature christened this the Redemption and it was much a restoration as that when Charles II brought Stuart rule back to England.

Issaquena County, beyond Vicksburg and Warren County, just north across the Yazoo, also enters the picture.<sup>72</sup> Montgomery had nothing to do with Issaquena, but his later adversary in the 1890 Convention did. Nicholas Lemann reports in some detail on one William S. Farish of Issaquena County in the 1875 crisis.

As one evaluates the Lemann account the black-white population ratio must have been around 22:1. White witnesses seem to say that Blacks were going to rise and kill the whites, and Black witnesses said whites were going to kill all the educated Blacks and all the brave men.

“Groups of ten or twelve whites began riding the back roads and waiting upon Negroes they considered troublemakers.”<sup>73</sup> On one weekend six men were found executed in the fields. In the days immediately following, the “white leaders met with a group of “good Negroes” who signed a formal agreement to deliver another list of “turbulent” men, including some Republican officeholders.<sup>74</sup> “There were,” wrote

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<sup>71</sup> . Lynch, quoted in McFarlin, 166).

<sup>72</sup> . Moreover, in the 20<sup>th</sup> century civil rights movement, Issaquena also enters. Minion K. C. Morrison,

<sup>73</sup>

. Nicholas Lemann, Redemption: The Last Battle of the Civil War New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006, 156.

<sup>74</sup>

. Ibid.

Lemann, “no more killings, but more parties—one of them led by William S. Farish, a former captain in the Confederate Army . . . rode through the plantations waiting upon people.”<sup>75</sup> Farish was a Davis family member.<sup>76</sup> In the days immediately following, the “white leaders met with a group of “good Negroes” who signed a formal agreement to deliver another list of “turbulent” men, including some Republican officeholders.<sup>77</sup>

Fifteen years after the Democratic takeover, there was new state legislation, then a gubernatorial proclamation setting an election date, a July 1890 election. When this 1890 Convention was elected Mississippi was a Black voting majority state. The black men theoretically entitled to vote were 189,884 or 61 percent of the total of 308, 684.

Except for extreme adversity, there is no way for a 61% voting majority to 1 delegate of out of 134. When the Convention assembled on August 12, 1890, it had 133 white delegates and one black delegate, Isaiah T. Montgomery.<sup>78</sup> Montgomery appeared on the first day of the Convention, in the “rapidly decaying Old Capitol. . . ‘in a dreadful state of decay,’ with cracking walls, falling plaster, leaking roof, and other ailments too numerous to list.”<sup>79</sup> The dreadful state of decay was not merely the condition of the capitol building, but also the condition of the polity itself.

The Convention is where Montgomery’s political choices and resultant reputation

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<sup>75</sup>

. Ibid.

<sup>76</sup>99. Frank Everett, Brierfield, Hattiesburg: College and Universities Press, 19xx, Appendix, The Genealogy of the Davis Family, 127; “Farish, William Stamps,” The Handbook of Texas. Online.

<http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/view/FF/ffa7.html>

<sup>77</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>78</sup>

. Matthew Holden, Jr., Isaiah T. Montgomery and Emancipation: ITM Discussion Paper 2013-3, Isaiah T. Montgomery Studies Project, P. O. Box 14088, LeFleur Station, Jackson, MS 39236

<sup>79</sup> . John Ray Skates, Mississippi’s Old Capitol: Biography of a Building Jackson, MS: Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 1990, 104.

come into play. Perhaps the first thing that the ordinary reader needs to know is how Isaiah T. Montgomery where came from and how he got there.

### Bolivar County as Montgomery's Locale

In the late 1870s and early 1880s, Montgomery and his family found both the economic environment and the political environment less and less workable in Warren County. The analysis, so far we are concerned with Isaiah Montgomery, is that he moved to Bolivar County in 1887,<sup>80</sup> and was elected to the Convention as a Bolivar delegate in 1890.

In 1890, this territory was still a largely undeveloped frontier.<sup>81</sup> "The Delta" is the alluvial plain bounded on the west by the Mississippi River and the east by the Yazoo River, nineteen counties overwhelmingly Black in population, historically dominated by cotton plantation agriculture. The America that reads best-selling books once was very familiar with the representation of this region in writings by David Cohn,<sup>82</sup> and William Alexander Percy,<sup>83</sup> in American political science by V. O. Key,<sup>84</sup> and Hodding Carter, the editor of the Delta Democrat-Times,<sup>85</sup> and of his son who was Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs during the Iran hostage crisis.<sup>86</sup>

Bolivar County politics requires some comprehension back at least to the 1850s. The single compendium that testified as of what the white settlers said and thought was published in 1948, and reprinted in 1976.<sup>87</sup> It is, suffice it to say clearly, a white people's story of Bolivar County. There appears –even with the rise of African American studies

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<sup>80</sup> . "My Recollections of the Early Days of Bolivar County," in 109.

<sup>81</sup> . Florence Warfield Sillers (compiler), Wirt A. Williams) History of Bolivar County, Mississippi, Spartanburg, S. C., 1976, (editor.)

<sup>82</sup> . Where I Was Born and Raised

<sup>83</sup>

. Lanterns on the Levee,

<sup>84</sup>

. Southern Politics

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<sup>87</sup> . Florence Warfield Sillers (compiler), Wirt A. Williams (editor), and Evelyn Hammett (indexer), History of Bolivar County, Mississippi Jackson, MS: Hederman Brothers Printing, 1948.

since the civil rights movement, very little pre-civil rights history of Bolivar County based upon recent research.<sup>88 89</sup>

As it happens, political science has, as it emerged in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, largely focused on urban (and Northern) data, so that was hard even to try to imagine (conceptualize) how control was exercised in rural government and politics at the time. Control was exercised by and amongst a small set of frontiers settlers (landholders and slaveholders),<sup>90</sup> often with upper class Eastern and even English aristocratic connections. They owned the land, owned the slaves, and held or controlled the public offices.<sup>91</sup> Perhaps the best model, if one could attempt to use it retrospectively, would be the “regime” model set forth by Clarence Stone.<sup>92</sup> (However, even the methods used half a century ago by Robert A. Dahl, for studying local decision-making in New Haven, where intense political conflict sometimes occurred between personal and family factions.<sup>93</sup> One has to think through this in order to appraise the election of Isaiah T.

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<sup>88</sup> . The writings of Ralph Eubanks and xxxx Walton, adults who are of a generation barely born at the time of James Meredith’s marches and his admission to the University of Mississippi deserve some attention here. This comment expresses the author’s view that there is no coherent study integrating the whole Delta (white and Black) analytically, and taking into account the whole body of social science and law with the business and technological changes that have occurred in the post-cotton dominant economy and the post-white supremacy era.

<sup>89</sup> . David Beito and Linda Roster Beito, on TRM Howard; James Hicks and others on the Emmett Till case, Connie Curry; xxx Local People, Sunflower County book; Fred Wirt. Suffice it to say, there is a literature, based on Black (and white volunteer) experience in the Delta from the 1950s through the adoption and implementation of the Federal civil rights legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, and the emergence of Blacks as a significant bloc in state politics.

<sup>90</sup> .

<sup>91</sup> . Dahl?

<sup>92</sup> . Jennifer Hochschild, “Clarence Stone and the Study of Urban Politics,” in Marion Orr and Valerie Johnson (eds.) Power in the City: Clarence Stone and the Politics of Inequality, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008, 317-334.

<sup>93</sup> . Who Governs, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960?, for the historical treatment of

## Montgomery to the 1890 Constitutional Convention.

Fusion Politics and Bolivar County.- From time to time, there are groups – political parties or some other groups – that find they cannot achieve their purposes separately but cannot or will not merge completely. So they cooperate temporarily. This is often called “fusion,” and by students of other countries likely to go under the heading of “coalition” politics.<sup>94</sup> In Bolivar, and a few other counties, in which the white population was very small, and almost entirely dependent on Negro labor,<sup>95</sup> leaders would make deals in any given election to guarantee certain outcomes beforehand. Voters would be offered Democratic candidate (and thus white men) for some offices and would be offered Republican candidates (meaning black men usually) for other offices.<sup>96</sup>

Vernon Wharton said “the fusion system did work to the general satisfaction of a majority of both races.”<sup>97</sup> This cannot have been true, at least as based on the testimony of white settlers of Bolivar County. Vernon Wharton relies on a white Bolivar Countian, a man called Frank A. Montgomery.<sup>98</sup> (no connection to Isaiah Montgomery) for evidence of general satisfaction. But Frank A. Montgomery evidently was repelled by Blacks in general.<sup>99</sup> Perhaps like Thomas Jefferson he felt that they were too ugly to look at.

He had said that Blacks were so alien that it was humiliating to whites that they should vote,<sup>100</sup> and when “in the fall of 1869, Negroes

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<sup>94</sup> . Carol Mershon?

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. Roberts, ; Ibid, 204, note 23)

<sup>96</sup>

. Wharton, 203

<sup>97</sup>

. Ibid. 203.

<sup>98</sup> . Lottie Montgomery, “Colonel Frank A. Montgomery,” in Sillers, (comp.), History of Bolivar County, Mississippi 483-485.

<sup>99</sup>

. Notes on Virginia, Query XIV.

<sup>100</sup> . Lottie Montgomery, at p. 484.

were first put on juries. . . Colonel Montgomery felt it would be a degradation to serve with them.”<sup>101</sup> But he spoke respectfully of John R. Lynch whose white fatherhood showed in his own appearance, feared him as a political debater, and urged one of his friends not to challenge Lynch, for he surely would lose.<sup>102</sup> He similarly spoke respectfully of Blanche K. Bruce who had, he said, the manners of a Chesterfield. From this I infer that he was not uncomfortable with these two sons of white fathers.

The idea that he was generally satisfied with fusion is illogical. He did not like it all. He just put up with it when he had no choice.<sup>103</sup>

J. C. Burrus in 1923 asserted of Bolivar County “Our county offices were filled with alien thieves, Negroes, and Southern Scalwags; our legislative assemblies by the same base horde” delivery from “the body of this death” was attained by the Ku Klux Klan, “this famous association, supported by the sentiment of many of the best people of the North, who understood and condemned the conditions as they were in the South.”<sup>104</sup>

Burrus said that “the famous association” protected “integrity of the white race,” which presumably meant the Klan punished white men who had Black sex partners, the evidence of which was all about. Yet it was Union (and thus carpet bagger) control that was constantly charged with the aim of “mongrelization.” It was also the Klan, “supported by the sentiment of many of the best people of the North” that Burrus also said white people were indebted to for “perhaps the existence of our government.”<sup>105</sup>

Frank Montgomery and J. C. Burrus were not alone. Walter Sillers, Sr. and William Bureauregard Roberts used much of the same language. Originally, in the 1870s, young Walter Sillers had been a stringent supporter of a white line for Democrats. He was quite explicit in satisfaction with the white takeover in 1875, and in praising the Ku Klux Klan, as was his contemporary William B. Roberts. His writing shows both intelligent realism and a sense of humor, described the process in Bolivar County. But Sillers learned to count politically, and seemed to have shifted his own ideas, at least to

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<sup>101</sup> . Ibid.

<sup>102</sup>

. Frank Montgomery, Reminiscences of a Mississippian in Peace and War. 1901?

<sup>103</sup>

. Frank A. Montgomery, 290.

<sup>104</sup> .

<sup>105</sup> .

the extent that he did not scruple to recognize the skills of the Black leaders. For example, he mentioned a case where the Democrats followed the white line strictly.

But the reality was that black Republicans could vote and could run, and given their numbers could always win if a racial line were drawn. Despite the attitudes of Burrus and Frank Montgomery, and those whom they symbolize, for various reasons, if the numerous Blacks were not physically afraid to vote, as they were not in Bolivar, some white Democrats, as a political scientist should predict, would split off and run with Republicans on “fusion” tickets.

Walter Sillers, Sr. referred an election, apparently in 1883, when Democrats were not supposed to cooperate with Republicans in any way. “A white Republican by the name of Libby, the brilliant negro leader J. H. Bufford,<sup>106</sup> and George W. Gayles, negro state senator,<sup>107</sup> took advantage of the dissension and offered the votes of the Republican party for sheriff to any white man who would bolt the Democratic party and lead the ticket.” That indicates another white faction on which we have little knowledge. But there is just enough, from the testimony of Sillers. George P. Melchior, who had influential relatives in the county who espoused his cause, and Melchior accepted the offer. “A split in the Democratic party resulted, with twenty years of bitter factionalism.”<sup>108</sup>

Melchior’s family and interests appear to have lain in the more northerly and eastern part of Bolivar County. None of the historical material so far available has anything informative about Melchior and his relatives after 1896. The Journal of the Constitutional Convention shows Melchior with an address at Bellevue, which was the post office of what since became Shelby, MS.

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<sup>106</sup> . Walter Sillers, “Isaiah T. Montgomery,” in Sillers, op. cit. (comp.), 592-594 contains the text of a eulogy for Isaiah T. Montgomery. It contains some other pertinent material, and the whole compilation was published in 1948. Hence it is not certain which Walter Sillers prepared all the material published at the cited pages. Walter Sillers, Sr.’s draft of a funeral speech for Montgomery and for Joseph Bufford are in the archives at Delta State University.

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. In 1887, Simmons, Men of Mark reported Gayles as “the only colored state senator, there being none other since 1875.” Op. cit., 406.

<sup>108</sup>

. Walter Sillers, Sr., “Reconstruction,” in Wirt A. Williams) History of Bolivar County, Mississippi, Spartanburg, S. C., 1976. (comp.), at p. 160.

“In 1883.the Honorable Charles Scott, the writer (Walter Sillers), and other lawyer friends of Mr. [George Y.] Scott closed their offices in May and began one of the most bitter, protracted, and expensive campaigns the county has ever seen.”<sup>109</sup> They were trying to defeat Sheriff George Melchior, and they succeeded. But their success lasted one term. Melchior ran again for sheriff and defeated George Y. Scott. Seven years later came the Constitutional Convention and Melchior turned out to be white candidate who would run on a ticket with Montgomery. If Charles Scott were opposed to Melchior as far back as 1883, why would he now have changed to join in supporting seating of the Montgomery-Melchior ticket in 1890?

In due course Walter Sillers, Sr. seems to have become a close ally of Isaiah Montgomery. He appears to have been about five years younger than Montgomery, and they thus met when Montgomery was 40 and Sillers about 35. It appears, subject to verification, that Sillers became Montgomery’s lawyer and that Montgomery helped in getting Black votes for prohibition, a cause which was important to Mrs. Sillers.<sup>110</sup>

Rough Quantification of Bolivar Population and Voting.- The precise numbers in Bolivar County in 1890 have not been calculated for this paper. At the very least, there is now a need a compendium of population data and voting data similar to the old-fashioned America Votes data once published by Richard Scammon.<sup>111</sup> Using Frank Montgomery’s numbers indicates a White-Black voter ratio of about 13.3:1 or 4000/300 in 1875. That is white voter were slightly less than six percent (6%) of the electorate.<sup>112</sup> State Sen. W. B. Roberts said that in 1882, he said “the 250 white voters were confronted

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<sup>109</sup> . Walter Sillers, “George Y. Scott,” in Sillers, comp.) Williams (editor), and Hammett (indexer), 512.

<sup>110</sup> . Personal correspondence between Walter Sillers, Sr. and his wife, when they were recently married and she was quite young, reveals strong mutual interest and respect on matters of political judgment. (Thomas Boschert manuscript as source?)

Walter Sillers, Jr., for whom the tallest building in Jackson, Mississippi, the executive headquarters of the state government, is named was member of the state house of representative for fifty years and was the longest serving and very powerful Speaker of the House of Representatives. Benjamin Sperry;

<sup>111</sup> . America Votes, Washington, DC: Governmental Affairs Institute, 196?

<sup>112</sup>

. Frank A. Montgomery, 289.

with over four thousand Negro voters.”<sup>113</sup> That would have shifted the ratio from 13:1 to 16:1 or somewhere between four per cent (4%) and five percent (5%) of the electorate.

Roberts looked back in 1937 to say that in the decade before the Convention there had been “more than four thousand negro votes in Bolivar County with only six hundred, possibly eight hundred white voters, and many of the white voters indifferent to the result of the election.” With Roberts’ rough figures we could estimate something between 12% and 15% of the total as being white.

The Black voting population was remaining steady, but the white voting population was increasing. When the Constitutional Convention was called, the Democrats refused fusion. Perhaps it was out of overconfidence. They nominated Edward H. Moore, the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors, later state senator from Bolivar County, and William Lafayette Pearman.<sup>114</sup>

Moore was graduate of Davidson College and Virginia Military Institute. He was married to the daughter of Frank Montgomery, whose distaste for the black people is known by his own testimony in his own book.<sup>115</sup>

Pearman had migrated from the Atlantic Coast as far as Texas, always had as his objective “the finding of rich farm lands.” He settled on a property near which the railroad company also built a track, from which arose a railroad station and the site of Cleveland.<sup>116</sup> He also saw “the need for a courthouse in the eastern part of the county” and donated the land on the courthouse was built.” Charles Scott is cited as saying that Pearman’s perception resulted in the location of the courthouse in Cleveland.<sup>117</sup>

Cleveland, the county seat of Bolivar County, is in 2016 the site of Delta

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<sup>113</sup>

. Roberts, “After the War Between the States,” in Florence Warfield Sillers (compiler,), Wirt A. Williams), History of Bolivar County, Mississippi; Spartanburg, S. C., 1976., (comp.), 162)

<sup>114</sup>

. As a state senator, Moore later sponsored the legislation to create the Mississippi Department of Archives and History.)

<sup>115</sup> . Lotta Moore Armstead, “Edward Harris Moore,” in Sillers (comp.), 486.

<sup>116</sup> . Cowan v. Cleveland School District; and, xxxxx, New York Times, May 2016

<sup>117</sup> . Perle Pearman, “William Lafayette Pearman,” op. cit., 497-499.

State University,<sup>118</sup> a new Grammy Museum,<sup>119</sup> and Baxter Healthcare Corporation.<sup>120</sup> The city is also the situs of a school segregation case which has been going on for sixty years.<sup>121</sup>

### Montgomery's Election to the Convention Presence:

Within a year of his moving to Mound Bayou, Isaiah T. Montgomery had become involved with the Republicans. "In 1888 I was placed on the Republican County Committee in Bolivar County." Was this his own motion, ambition, or was he pulled into it by others? Nothing shows one way or the other, though Joseph Ousley, another black man from Warren County, was also in Bolivar, as one of the leading men of a Black town called Renova. He was active in Republican politics.

Given the connections of the two nominees, and what happened in the rest of the state, there is an obvious question as to why the Bolivar County Republicans, under the circumstances, would even take the chances of putting up a ticket? If, one may speculate, Ousley as a party chairman did not want to bow out altogether. There were still other black Republicans, and Montgomery –new to the area – had some record of knowing how to deal with white people. Beyond that, he and Ousley were family friends. Fifteen years before, Mary Virginia, had a diary entry about Joe Ousley coming to visit. When Ousley got Montgomery onto his county committee he knew what he was doing and what he was getting.

Why did the Republicans, under the circumstances, would even take the chances of putting up a ticket?

Moreover, though the name of Charles Scott does not appear to be mentioned in the Constitution documents, Scott was a major landholding entrepreneur, married to a member of the Yerger family, evidently had worked politically some of the Black

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<sup>118</sup> . [www.deltastate.edu](http://www.deltastate.edu).

<sup>119</sup> . Grammy Museum

<sup>120</sup> . Baxter Healthcare Corporation

<sup>121</sup> . Cowan v. Cleveland School District

politicians. He was highly praised by Burrus, who claimed him as a longtime personal friend, who said “by his transcendent ability, soon placed himself at the head of the bar of Bolivar County; and as long as he lived was a dominant factor in civic affairs.”

Scott was similarly praised by Walter Sillers, Sr, with whom he had sometimes an adversarial relation. The pertinence here is that current scholarship associates the debate about whether to seat Montgomery and Melchior to a split between the Sillers faction of the Bolivar County Democrats and the Scott faction. That may explain why Delegate William C. Yerger wanted to get off the committee to evaluate the Bolivar County contest.

Delegate Yerger (Washington County) was the son of an eminent Mississippi family, son of the man under whom Scott had read, the lawyer for the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad, and law partner of LeRoy Percy. There is no definite evidence, on present information, as what was at stake in this change. But it could have been difficult for Yerger to embarrass Montgomery, one of whose main tasks was to sell land to Black settlers in the Mound Bayou area.

Montgomery felt called upon to say, “In all County affairs I have actively indorsed a fusion movement in county elections.” This meant that he was one of the people who sought the idea of cooperation with white people. “I was,” he wrote later, “earnestly pressed by the Republican County Committee to become a candidate in company with Hon. George P. Melchoir (his spelling) Ousley and the Republicans had found Melchior to be the white man with whom they could cooperate, when other at least some other prominent white people were refusing, for most of the last decade.

It is plausible to imagine – but we do not know – his saying “we will to concede something, without knowing beforehand what the “something” would be. There is an serious need for some political scientist or historian to conduct a detailed analysis of the challenge and the vote on dealing with it.<sup>122</sup> Here we can only reason as best we can, from tiny fragments. Isaiah T. Montgomery ran as a Republican, and as a result of the election held July 29, 1890, got his “first commission to any elective office, viz., as delegate from Bolivar County to the Constitutional Convention.”<sup>123</sup> Montgomery last

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<sup>122</sup> . Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race: Mississippi After Reconstruction, 1877-1917, Jackson: University Press of Mississippi for the Mississippi Historical Society, 2006, 114, n. 12.

<sup>123</sup> . ITM in Sillers (comp.) 590.)

86. Journal . . . , 'Tabular View, Mississippi Constitutional Convention

listed as Republican and Melchior as a Democrat in Convention Journal.<sup>124</sup> Now that Montgomery and Melchior were elected, the question arose of a challenge to their being seated.

Montgomery's Convention Presence: Challenge to Montgomery and Melchior's Seating<sup>125</sup>

Stephen Cresswell says "The Montgomery-Melchoir's ticket's credentials were very briefly challenged at the convention, not because of its Republican roots but because the powerful Walter Sillers faction of Delta politicians opposed the slate, while the rival Charles Scott faction of Democrats supported it."<sup>126</sup> In other words, this has to mean that in 1890, for the Constitutional Convention, the Democrats aligned with Charles Scott would not support the floor challenge.

There is a puzzlement with this situation.

The common view in writing about the 1890 Constitution is that Senator J. Z. George was the real leader of the Convention, and that Montgomery's election and admission was pre-ordained by some deal with Senator George.

The Convention President who had nominated by the railroad-banker-planter coalition and so did R. C. Patty, who had been the immediate runner up and the obvious candidate of the Farmers' Alliance, and was the Chairman of the Franchise Committee. As to the election, the evidence in this paper clearly is that it was not smooth and uncontested.

The process of turning emancipation into counter-emancipation shows Montgomery's choices, the time in which they were made, and the bases for considering them in 2016. These choices were dictated by the fact that the slaveholding world had been defeated, but a very large portion of that world had no intention of accepting defeat. The question is whether Montgomery cooperated to sustain that counter-emancipation.

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-1890," 707.

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<sup>125</sup> . Professor Dorothy Pratt is engaged in a study of the Convention, although it is not apparent if this issue is in accord with her inquiry.

<sup>126</sup> . Stephen Cresswell, Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race: Mississippi after Reconstruction 1877-1917, (Heritage of Mississippi Series, Volume II) Jackson: University Press of Mississippi for the Mississippi Historical Society, 2006, 114.

There was a lot of organizational business August 12, that first day of the Convention. An official record does not show informal conversation in the cloakroom or out in the hallway. But in the very first day, “Mr. Love, of Amite, offered the following: Resolved, That the Convention do now proceed to the election by ballot of President of the Convention.”

Some kind of hallway conversations had to have taken place, since the proceeding moved quickly to skip the balloting. Very likely, someone pointed out the oddness of having any further Convention business conducted with the Secretary of State in the chair. “Before action thereon (on Love’s motion). Mr. Powel of DeSoto. Moved that Hon. W. S. Featherston, of Marshall, be elected temporary Chairman. Which was unanimously agreed to.”

“Gen. Featherston took the chair and declared the Convention ready for further business.”<sup>127</sup>

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“The Committee on Credentials reported as entitled to seats the 134 delegates, as read by the secretary of state. The Report as adopted subject to contest.”<sup>128</sup> The contest was that the aforementioned E. H. Moore and W. L. Pearman.

The key Convention business was, of course, the election of the President, which showed the comparative strength of the planter-banker-railroad lawyer caucus and the dirt farmers who cultivated their own family-sized farms and were represented through the Farmers Alliance.<sup>129</sup> Edward C. Mayes, the son-in-law of Lucius

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<sup>127</sup> . Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Mississippi, Begun at the City of Jackson on August 12, 1890, and Concluded November 1, 1890/Printed by Authority, Jackson, MS: E. L. Martin, Printer to the Convention, 8.

<sup>128</sup>

. Ibid. 12.

<sup>129</sup> . Montgomery is recorded as “Merchant & Plant.”, Journal . . . , ‘Tabular View, Mississippi Constitutional Convention -1890,’ 707.

Q.C. Lamar, nominated Judge S. S. Calhoun. Another delegate nominated R. C. Patty, a county officer from Noxubee. Calhoun got 64 votes, while Patty, the farmers' candidate, got 61 votes.<sup>130</sup>

Delegate William S. Farish, in the 1890 Convention, was very impatient. From the actual record it seems that he could barely wait for the organizational business to be conducted. The 47 year old lawyer from Mayersville in Issaquena County, had been a leader in the suppression of Blacks in 1875. On the first day, (Tuesday, August 12) some time near onto two, "Mr. Farish moved that a committee of five be appointed to investigate the contested election from Bolivar County" but "On motion of Mr. Street action thereon was postponed." He tried again in the afternoon to get ten minutes, apparently on the supposition that this would do the job. It did not. He lost his motion, and the Convention went to some other business.<sup>131</sup>

Thursday, most of whatever conversations must have occurred, since in the morning session, "On motion of Mr. Farish, the President appointed a committee of five to consider the contested election case from Bolivar County, to wit: Farish, Henry, Dillard, Allen and Yerger."<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid. 9.

<sup>131</sup> . Delegate Farish in 1890 could not foresee fate. As a virtual excursus, there is an apparent connection all the way into the 21st century. In the early 1900s, Mr. Farish's son graduated from University of Mississippi Law School, moved to Texas, got into the oil business, and became President of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, a predecessor company to Exxon, and one of the founders of the American Petroleum Institute.

His grandson is shown as a trustee of Beauvoir, the memorial home of Jefferson Davis at Biloxi. He was also shown in the public reports as the Ambassador to the Court of St. James, a leading man in thoroughbred horse racing, and close enough friend to have an annual hunting trip with the first President Bush. Jon Meacham, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Walker Bush, New York: Random House, 2015, 531.

<sup>132</sup> . Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Mississippi, Begun at the City of Jackson on August 12, 1890, and Concluded November 1, 1890/Printed by Authority, Jackson, MS: E. L. Martin, Printer to the Convention, 23.

Delegate William G. Yerger (Washington County) was the son of an eminent Mississippi family, lawyer for the Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad, and law partner of LeRoy Percy.<sup>133</sup> There is no definite evidence, on present information, as what was at stake in this change. But it could have been difficult for Yerger to embarrass Montgomery, one of whose main tasks was to sell land to Black settlers in the Mound Bayou area.

Farish's floor leadership in the contest against Montgomery's and Melchior's seating calls for some reflection. Was there some grudge from with the Davis family? Possibly. At minimum, he could know that the son of Ben Montgomery, of whom Jefferson Davis disapproved,<sup>134</sup> now sought to be a delegate. He could also know that George Melchior, a white man whose apparent self-interest and narrow family interest had within the previous decade led him into alliance with Blacks and Republicans,<sup>135</sup> and again in this Convention race into co-candidacy with Isaiah T. Montgomery and against Moore and Pearman, wanted be the other delegate.

Thursday morning, with some other important matters also demanding time, a motion was adopted that "the notice of contest of election of delegates from Bolivar County, now on file with the Secretary of this Convention, be referred to the committee to investigate such contested election."<sup>136</sup>

Something else was still going on to that, in the afternoon, "the President, at his request excused Mr. Yerger as a member of the Committee on Contested Election Case from Bolivar County, and substituted Mr. Ford instead."<sup>137</sup>

This committee is where the discussions that would yield results would have o

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<sup>133</sup> . Dattel, op. cit., 320.

<sup>134</sup> . Cooper, op. cit., William C. Davis?

<sup>135</sup> . Walter Sillers, Sr., "Reconstruction," in Sillers (comp.), 150.

<sup>136</sup>

. Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitution156-1577al Convention of the State of Mississippi, Begun at the City of Jackson on August 12, 1890, and Concluded November 1, 1890/Printed by Authority, Jackson, MS: E. L. Martin, Printer to the Convention,27.

<sup>137</sup>. Ibid. 28. Query: Who was Delegate Ford? Need more bio detail.

had to take place. It took a five more days, for a total of eight days to get the Bolivar County case finally back to the floor on the morning of Tuesday, August 19, with both majority and minority reports.<sup>138</sup> The Journal of the Convention does show the text these to reports. But the substance of the floor discussion is not available, although it could possibly be inferred from stenographic record that was to be kept for the media reports.

“Mr. Farrish (sp) from the Select Committee to investigate the contested election case from Bolivar county, moved the adoption of the majority report of the Committee,” which was against seating Montgomery and Melchior on a variety of legal and election procedural arguments.

Nonetheless, there was an alternative, which we here designate the Ford Motion..

“Mr. Ford offered the following substitute;

“Resolved. That Geo. P. Melchior and Isaiah T. Montgomery are legally entitled to and that they retain their seats in the Convention as delegates from the county of Bolivar.”<sup>139</sup>

This Ford Motion was carried to the next day (Wednesday, August 20, 1890) for a morning session in which there was a certain amount of procedural jousting over a motion that “That the Governor and the Ex-Governor of the State of Mississippi, and the Judges of the Supreme Court be allowed seats on the floor during the sitting of this Convention,” though the motion was finally adopted.<sup>140</sup>

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The substitute motion, in favor of seating Melchior and Montgomery, was approved 72/27 with 28 absent or not voting. Fifty four percent of the delegates voted to seat Montgomery and Melchior, but one in five voted against seating them and another one in five abstained or did not attend the session. For the present, the question of why

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<sup>138</sup> . Ibid., 67-74

<sup>139</sup> . Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Mississippi, Begun at the City of Jackson on August 12, 1890, and Concluded November 1, 1890/Printed by Authority, Jackson, MS: E. L. Martin, Printer to the Convention, 76.

<sup>140</sup> . Journal 75-76.

all these delegates struggled over this question remains up in the air intellectually.

The common view in writing about the 1890 Constitution is that Senator J. Z. George was the real leader of the Convention, and that Montgomery's election and admission was pre-ordained by some deal with Senator George.

Senator George abstained or did not vote. If George had some such deal, why would he hide behind abstention or not voting, except on the supposition that enough other people would cover for him?

I has not examined enough material from beyond the Journal to know how to evaluate George's leadership status. The Convention President who had nominated by the railroad-banker-planter coalition and so did R. C. Patty, who had been the immediate runner up and the obvious candidate of the Farmers' Alliance, and was the Chairman of the Franchise Committee.

All this suggests that there is an opportunity for some political scientist or historian to conduct a detailed analysis of the challenge and the vote on dealing with it.<sup>141</sup> As should have been expected Farish, the floor leader in behalf of exclusion, voted against the motion that allowed seating. Yerger voted for that motion.

Someone had to have practical reasons, or beliefs, leading them to want to seat Montgomery and Melchior. There is need for some explanation, since arguments of sheer analytical principle were not then being advanced in the interest of Blacks, or worse, white people (such as Melchior) allied with them. We do not know how to explain the result.<sup>142</sup> We do know the result. Montgomery and Melchior were seated.

### Montgomery's Convention Presence: What Did He Do There?

The formal record of the Franchise Committee does not show much of the committee's politics, but this may merely mean that we have not seen the right material.

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<sup>141</sup> . Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race: Mississippi After Reconstruction, 1877-1917, Jackson: University Press of Mississippi for the Mississippi Historical Society, 2006, 114, n. 12.

<sup>142</sup> . As a methodological proposition, it would be instructive if we had a rational choice analysis in the mode of William H. Riker, or alternatively a deep common sense analysis in the mode of Richard Fenno.

Ditto the floor politics. On September 15 1890, Montgomery stood alone in the Constitutional Convention to speak in support of the franchise committee report.<sup>143</sup> I interpret Montgomery's situation by the subtitle of this paper--political strategies under extreme adversity, not just "minority" status. I have to interpret his actions as those of a strategist who faces much external pressure and few options that he dare even assert.

No political scientist or political historian, writing about Mississippi, has confronted seriously one question: what did the Montgomery speech contemplate as to the future well-being of Mississippi?" Isaiah T. Montgomery was openly ready to submit to the political necessities of the military defeat that African Americans had experienced. Here was one black delegate facing a room full of white men. In the House chamber, a speaker from the rostrum could see the face of every other member.

His approach is best interpreted by reference to maxims of William M. McGovern previously cited. Montgomery proceeded knowing that he did not have the votes for tactical victories, so common in conventions. Nor had the votes a battle on one or two big issues. There was no choice of an effective alliance with Judge Chrisman, as Lynch later recommended.

He could only pursue a grand strategy of showing the Convention leaders of what they should accept as a rational and responsible elite. Montgomery did speak of fearing racial conflict, and of seeking permanent agreement to avoid it. He endorsed the Constitution that was designed to guarantee white political control. Amid the fear, Montgomery, and Montgomery alone, spoke with hope and a strategic vision that goes beyond racial conflict.

It is commonly said—and often accepted in conversation among Black scholars -- that Montgomery said Black people should be removed from the vote because they were not intelligent enough to vote. False.<sup>144</sup> There is not a line in which he says there is something wrong with the Black people. He is in a negotiating situation, where those whom he represents have little enforcement power but much that they deserve. Look at the language.

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<sup>143</sup> . "What Answer?" Speech in Support of Franchise Committee Report, Mississippi Constitutional Convention, 1890, by Isaiah T. Montgomery, edited by I, Charlottesville, AV: Isaiah T. Montgomery Studies Project, Inc., 2004.

<sup>144</sup> . Ibid.

Montgomery does resort to something akin to what Riker taught political scientists to call heresthetic<sup>145</sup>—the skillful articulation of the unconventional proposition that the other side should accept. Truly, he does identify himself as a Mississippian, and thus seeks an atmosphere of good will. We do not know if enough other delegates found him convincing that they voted for something less-bad (from his viewpoint) than they otherwise would supported. “Sometimes, Mr. President, as I gaze over our broad acres, my heart would rejoice in the progress and glory of Mississippi . . .”

But he pulls back to remind his colleagues. Amid the satisfaction, “is a feeling of sadness represses my exultation, as the unanswerable question arises.” Thus, he continues. “How much of life, how much of privation, sorrow and toil has it cost my people?” In all the growth, “Perchance every acre represents a grave and every furrow a tear.” This man who knew Jefferson Davis, whose personal copyist he had sometimes been thirty plus years before, could in behalf of Blacks ask this room full of Confederate veterans, “And what have they by way of recompense?”

Randall Robinson could not do better if he wanted philosophically to argue a case for reparations. Yet if Montgomery knew anything of the Jefferson Davis attitude he knew that “Davis was incensed when ‘an ass’ proposed to pay blacks reparations for their servitude.”<sup>146</sup>

Montgomery was making neither a defiance speech, nor a protest speech, but a surrender speech. Frederick Douglass, both the elder and the younger, properly characterized that. All we know is that Lynch says he made the wrong decision.

The analogy could be that the Montgomery strategy is close to that of Japan’s leaders after the experience of 1945. Two nuclear bombs had been dropped on Japan. Japan surrendered. Japanese representatives went aboard the battleship Missouri and signed the surrender before the world. Surrender when you are faced with overwhelming power is a rational strategy undertaken in the hope of future recovery.

We also know that some of the anti-Montgomery criticism is flatly wrong. Just as there is not a line in the speech claiming that Black people were not intelligent enough to vote, so there is a line proclaiming that the white people of Mississippi were right in their

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<sup>145</sup> . William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation

<sup>146</sup>

. William C. Davis, Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991, 681.

demands. But there is recognition that the demand cannot be resisted. “The white people determined that the best interests of the State and their own protection demanded that they should rule.”

Montgomery continues. “This rule being generally fixed and arbitrary, virtually amounts to a domination, with a fixed purpose to repress the Negro vote.” It is as if he were directly criticizing the opening statement of the Convention President, Judge S. S. Calhoon (Hinds County).

On the opening day, Judge Calhoon had said of “the two races now together, the rule of one . . . has always meant economic and moral ruin; we find another race whose rule as always meant prosperity and happiness, and prosperity and happiness to all races.”<sup>147</sup> Montgomery now, a month later, said of the determination to repress the Negro vote. “The methods adopted to produce this result have introduced into the body politic every form of demoralization - bloodshed, bribery, ballot-box stuffing. Corruption and perjury stalk unblushingly through the land.” The corruption and bribery that stalked unblushingly through the land was not that of the black men, but of white men, unless it meant that the Black men were the tools of the white men.

John Hope Franklin and Alfred Moss refer to conditions where post-Civil War planters took their tenants to the polls and voted them.<sup>148</sup> If planters could vote their tenants, as big city bosses voted their followings, then Montgomery might not have seen the franchise as always so valuable.<sup>149</sup> If this was true, then there would have been times when Blacks were mainly resources in the line of fire between contending planter factions, and arguably sometimes between rich white planters and gun-toting dirt farmers.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> . Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Mississippi, Begun at the City of Jackson on August 12, 1890, and Concluded November 1, 1890/Printed by Authority, Jackson, MS: E. L. Martin, Printer to the Convention, 10.

<sup>148</sup> . Where are the best quantitative estimates of this process? Review Hope and Moss and their sources for details on their evidence. MH April 24 2016.

<sup>149</sup> . I do not have proof, but as a student in Morton Grodzins’s undergraduate class, I was told of Chicago ward techniques in which political machine voters, with the collusion of election clerks, would be given a marked paper ballot to deposit, with the expectation that they would give the unmarked ballot to the next voter, ad seriatim to the end of the line.

<sup>150</sup>

. If that approach were valid, the dirt farmers would, at the minimum, think

Montgomery's formulation approximated the idea of a constitution for the governance of divided societies.<sup>151</sup> There is a term in political science called "consociational democracy." It did not then exist in political science, as it now does. His speech, accepted a guaranteed white voting majority, while the blacks would constitute no more than a third of the voting population. The strategy that seems rational, under the extreme adversity with which he began, but he had to have accepted the idea that the white supremacy constitution would turn over time into a constitution that allowed successful Black progress in coexistence along with a guarantee of white advantage.

Even while accepting provisions designed to remove two thirds of black voters-- not all of them-- in order to guarantee a white majority, he said fully a third of the blacks could accept any fair standard that whites would impose on themselves.

"It is due to us also that there should be some expression on the part of this great body indicating that the price is adequate, that the contract is ratified and accepted..." This is effectively a rhetorical claim of a political deal. It is the kind of political deal, in large part implicit, that Konrad Adenauer would have to hope that Charles DeGaulle would accept. In the interest of French acceptance, Adenauer accepted economic policies that did the French more good than they did the Germans."<sup>152</sup>

What white people in the North, let alone the South, thought about the Montgomery choices warrants attention that we do not have time and space to evaluate here. President Cleveland is said to have approved. What most Democrats had to say at the time is unknown. This is also so for most Republicans.

"If the man is to be judged by the speech, and it is not a "put up" speech, he is evidently the most remarkable man of his race who as appeared since the war. If the fact is as it seems to be, and, while fully appreciating the fate and suffering and service of his people, and the unspeakable wrong which has been done to them, he is yet able to take the view which he declares in words which even in the poor abstract of a report are

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of the Black voters as mere tools in the hands of the rich planters.

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. Arendt Lijphart; Matthew Holden, Jr.

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. Ronald Irving, Adenauer, 108.)

eloquent, Mr. Montgomery's name will be written high among those of wise and patriotic Americans.”

Harper's Weekly continued, “Whether his people would consent to their own disfranchisement, which would be extensive, although the change would not take effect until 1896, is a question. It would be an act of devotion which can be hardly anticipated. The consent of such voters upon such ground would be one of the most extraordinary acts in political history.<sup>153</sup>

Twentieth century, and even more twenty first century, academic historians veer between mystification and pitying contempt that somehow Montgomery had not been perceptive enough to ally himself with populists or even socialists.<sup>154</sup>

### What Did African Americans Think At the Time?

What did African Americans at the time think Montgomery should have done between August 12, 1890 (when the Convention met) and November 1, 1890, when it adjourned sine die. It would be desirable to have statistically competent data on what African Americans at the time thought about Isaiah T. Montgomery and the course that he followed. What mass Black opinion would have been is impossible to estimate, using present data and with present techniques.

As to Black elite opinion. We can make some guesses by dividing those who had something to say into three groups.

**Group 1** were the urban outsiders and exiles in Washington and northward. Some were some who were critical, but tolerant and some offered outright praise... The verbal African Americans had different degrees of disagreement or agreement Montgomery's course of action. Generally, the closer people were to the realities of the time, the more they were willing to give Montgomery credit, and sometimes to agree with him.

Under conditions of extreme adversity, the more outspoken members of a leadership will tend to seek external allies, and to create lives for themselves. The educated outsiders who always lived in the Northern or Eastern cities or who had migrated for political, professional, or cultural advantage most strongly objected to the

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<sup>153</sup> . Harper's Weekly, October 4, 1890, p. 767

<sup>154</sup> . I will turn to this in a separate paper on “Historians Against Montgomery.”

Montgomery approach.

This can be seen in the way that Timothy Thomas Fortune and \_\_\_\_\_, a prominent vehicle of the African American elite outside the South dealt with the situation.<sup>155</sup>

The New York Age went at the subject on at least three occasions.

Twelve days after Montgomery's speech (or September 27), Fortune published an editorial, "Disfranchised." The editorial says, "There was perhaps nothing left for Isaiah T. Montgomery of Bolivar, the only member of the Mississippi Constitutional Convention, so called, to do but make a speech on the franchise. . ." Fortune quotes at length a crucial portion. Perhaps no man was ever called upon by the nature of his surroundings to adopt a more radical or iniquitous measure than was Mr. Montgomery." Fortune had some reason to know "the nature of the surroundings." His own father was then one of the remaining African American state politicians in Florida. The same issues of African American participation were present in Florida as in the other former Confederate states.

"Perhaps he adopted the wisest and safest course available to him." Fortune had some sense of reality, as he also discussed the extremity of the sacrifice, 123,000 black voters. He concludes "Did he do right, was it wise for him sanction a measure he did approve, binding, in a measure, not only himself, but all the race in his State to accept in good faith and abide by a measure intended forever to disfranchise them, to exclude them from all participation whatsoever in the administration of the government of which they are part? " It may be that he did, (but) we think not."

Some further calculation is called for. The numbers used, and that Fortune does not challenge, say that 2/3 of the Black voters were being removed. If 2/3 are removed, then 1/3 remain. That is not the same as excluding African Americans from all participation whatsoever in the administration of the government, although that was the ultimate result.

Frederick Douglass (1817-1895) is represented under the caption, "Mr. Montgomery's Speech." In that column, Frederick Douglass, apparently preparing for his mission to Haiti, was quoted at length Two weeks later (October 11, 1890). The Douglass

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<sup>155</sup> . "Fortune, Timothy Thomas," by Emma Lou Thornbrough, in Rayford W. Logan and Michael E. Winston (Eds.), Dictionary of American Negro Biography eds., New York: W. w. Norton, 1982, 236-238.

commentary contains the quotation that exists as ad nauseam cliché in contemporary writing. “No thoughtless, flippant fool could have inflicted such a wound upon our cause as Mr. Montgomery has done in this address.”

Douglass pays open tribute to Montgomery’s intelligence, statesmanlike calmness, and responsibility. “Such a man is not to be dismissed by calling him a traitor nor a self-seeking hypocrite, for he is neither the one nor the other.” He then offers a military analogy. “Like a general on the field of battle, he has retreated when he could no longer fight and has surrendered a post which he thought he could no longer successfully defend.”

Frederick Douglass limited himself, though to attacking the action, not the actor. He said he had “no denunciation of the man Montgomery [who] is not a conscious traitor the act is treason . . . to the cause of the colored people, not only of his own State, but of the United States.”<sup>156</sup> Montgomery’s intention, Douglass says, is beneficent, but his action is disastrous. It is “assassination.”

Montgomery, he said, has a position that is “deplorable, and will eventually fill his soul with bitter reflections.” There is some evidence that this forecast may have been right, in the end, at least shown by a speech of Montgomery’s thirty three years later.<sup>157</sup>

The last part of Douglass’s critique skips over all the practical issues of the time and moves to a broad rhetorical and philosophical level. There is no “race problem.” Nor is there an immigrant problem. Nor is there a Catholic problem. The “solution of the real problem is, so far as the Government of the United States is concerned, to see that each and all the descriptions of persons and sects under the broad wings of the American eagle should be protected in every right, privilege, and immunity guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.”

Douglass’s outrage is understandable, and one may suspect it was not pretended. In this Convention defense of the franchise committee report, Montgomery had borrowed directly from Douglass: “To quote the language of a leading Negro statesman, I will say ‘It is the ship. All else is an open, raging, tempestuous sea.’” This paraphrases a speech by Frederick Douglass, in which he said that African Americans had to be Republicans. The Republican Party was the ship. All else was the sea. In all this critique, does Douglass has anything to say about what Montgomery should have done between August 12, 1890 (when the Convention met) and November 1, 1890, when it adjourned

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<sup>156</sup> . Hill, 2005.

<sup>157</sup>

. Below, on the address to the Committee of One Hundred, as cited at p.

sine die? The answer appears to be “no.”

On the other hand, Montgomery appeared never to articulate the absolute Declaration of Independence universalism or the constitutional doctrines of citizenship rights that were the absolute norm for Douglass and that have passed into the dominant moral norm for African leadership and thought until the present generations.

T. McCants Stewart (1854-1923) was then a person of some prominence amongst the literate African American professionals.<sup>158</sup> Stewart is no longer a well-known figure. He had an interesting and complex history, in New York, Hawaii, the West Indies, Africa, and England. As a relative newcomer (age 35 or 36), Stewart had been a mere child during the war. He did not have the Republican party prestige that Douglass had. He seems to have tended toward the Democrats during the Grover Cleveland Presidency.

Stewart said he was reluctant to criticize Montgomery. Montgomery was on the spot, and able to judge better than someone from afar. He said he agreed with the educational qualification, which is what he thought would reduce the African American franchise. But he thought “Mr. Montgomery should have protested strongly and emphatically against the omission of the property qualification” and against what became “the understanding clause.” Stewart also used his essay to criticize white Mississippians.

Frederick Douglass, Jr. ( ), slightly older than Montgomery, had a New York Age commentary on October 18, 1890. The younger Douglass shows remarkable empathy with Montgomery, with whose policy he said he did not agree. He speaks with the cold comprehension of realpolitik.

Look at Douglass’s description of things Montgomery has seen:

- (1) the Negro as slave, freedman, soldier, and so-called citizen;
- (2) Government . . . turn him over to the tender mercies of his former oppressors . . .
- (3) friends counsel patience in the face of murder and persecution;
- (4) those who fought the Government given power to nullify rights;
- (5) “the whole North aroused in denunciation whenever force was used to maintain the Negro’s rights at the ballot box”;
- (6) state legislatures given into the hands of those dedicated to a white man’s

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158

. “Stewart, T. McCants,” in Logan and Wilson (1982), 571-573 by Clarence G. Contee, Jr.; and, Simmons (ed.), Men of Mark, 757-759.

party;

(7) colored citizens driven from their homes while the general government is helpless.

Douglass, Jr. says “He (Montgomery) naturally turns to those who have it in their power to better or make worse his condition and tries to bring about a concession which he hopes will be lasting, to better the condition of his people.”

Of the policy itself, he adopts language very like that of his father. Douglass the elder had spoken of the general retreating when he could no longer fight and has surrendering what he could no longer successfully defend.

Montgomery’s position “seems to me a full and complete surrender, admitting of no rally hereafter. Any policy which puts us deeper into the pit on a one-sided good faith, from which there can be no escape after a violation of confidence, is a bad policy.”

No one of Montgomery’s chronological generation of action, no matter how much in disagreement, could fail to recognize the harsh realities. At the same time, no one of the Northern critics could persuasively argue some course that Montgomery should have followed at the time. No one could come to the point of denunciation.

Group 2 consisted of the Black elite in Mississippi, the well-to-do and educated Black people resident in Mississippi who, between 1869 and the 1880s, used to be politically alert and open, but who now discovered good reasons to stay at home, and to be prudent and silent. **The black leadership in Mississippi appears on the record isolated from Montgomery.**  
<sup>159</sup>

Six persons can be mentioned. They are Hiram Revels, Blanche K. Bruce, John R. Lynch, James Hill, Willis E. Mollison and Samuel A. Beadle. They were men of substance, yet they came to the point of virtual silence in the Mississippi of 1890.

**Hiram Revels.-** Hiram Revels, the first black United States Senator ever, was still alive. He had been elected to fill Jefferson Davis’s seat. His time in

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<sup>159</sup> . Some of the Black Mississippians of substance at this time are mentioned in Lawrence Otis Graham, The Senator and the Socialite: The True Story of America’s First Black Dynasty New York: HarperCollins, 2006, mainly in Chapters 4 and 5. There is some further discussion at various parts of

Mississippi overlapped with that of Jefferson Davis, sometimes also back in Mississippi as he sought to establish a new life himself. Once out of the Senate, Revels was back in Mississippi, residing in Holly Springs—a town to which Ida B. Wells, not yet Wells-Barnett, was connected, as was James Hill, of whom more momentarily, and General William Featherstone, who was temporary chairman on the first day of the Convention.

There was ample opportunity for the informal conversation that political bodies generate.

### **Blanche K. Bruce (1841-1898).**

Bruce had served his lone term in the Senate and might have gone back to Mississippi. For his time in Mississippi, he seems to have been very successful in keeping the peace with his white constituents. He had not, once he became senator, found it prudent to too much in the advocacy of local Black Republicans.

He still had farm property interests in Bolivar County. But by this time he was effectively a Washingtonian, though also still making claims to Republican leadership.<sup>160</sup> What, if anything, was open to Bruce as a means of influencing Montgomery's choice in a convention where the reported leader was Senator J. Z. George whom the Democrats had put in to replace Bruce?

### **John R. Lynch (1847-1940).**

The former Congressman, John R. Lynch, was the sole exception of Black Mississippi political leaders who seems to have said much about

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<sup>160</sup>Florence Warfield Sillers (compiler, ), Wirt A. Williams, History of Bolivar County, Mississippi, Spartanburg, S. C., 1976, (editor), and Evelyn Hammett (indexer).

. Lawrence Otis Graham, The Senator and the Socialite: The True Story of America's First Black Dynasty New York: HarperCollins, 2006, 159.

## Montgomery and the 1890 Constitution.

Lynch would have been a natural leader in such a matter if he had chosen to make a controversy within the state. But by the time of the 1890 Convention, John R. Lynch appeared already to have been shifting his life outside the state. Richard Vallely, as a leading political scientist in the first decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century, notes that the “state’s Republican African American leadership, principally former Mississippi house speaker and U. S. representative John Roy Lynch and former senator Blanche Bruce, traveled in Republican circles, splitting their time between Washington and Mississippi.”<sup>161</sup> Lynch had farm interests in Adams County, but he already had a job at the Treasury Department in Washington.

Criticisms from John R. Lynch have been damaging to the reputation of Isaiah T. Montgomery,<sup>162</sup> though Lynch was careful in what he said.<sup>163</sup> Under the caption, “The Mississippi Plan,” Lynch said he had known Montgomery “favorably and well for a number of years,” and believed him to be “a man of good sense, a sound Republican and loyal to his race.”

Lynch said he had written Montgomery, and gotten a letter in response. “You will notice,” Lynch said Montgomery had written him, “that, in the speech, I have gone as far as possible on the lines indicated, and supported the committee report as a choice of evils.”

Lynch, unlike Douglass, did have an idea what Montgomery should have done. Lynch states his own view. “I am satisfied that that the proposition, the adoption of which Mr. Montgomery advocated, was not what he wanted, but he seems to have been laboring under the impression that if it were rejected, a worse proposition would be adopted.”

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161

. Richard Vallely, The Two Reconstructions, Chicago?: University of Chicago Press, 247, n. 53.

162

. Lynch was one the main sources cited in the Logan and Winston entry on Montgomery.

163

. New York Age, October 18, 1890.

He continued that “It is on this point that Mr. Montgomery, in my opinion, has made a grave, if not a fatal, mistake.” Instead, Lynch said Montgomery should have made an alliance with Judge Joseph B. Chrisman, who advocated an unconditional educational and property qualification. In this, Lynch makes a tactical recommendation, much less than a strategic recommendation, in accepting the idea that Black voting would be reduced educational and property tests, which is what Judge Chrisman advocated?

From a political scientist’s view of committee politics, or the floor politics, this would have made little sense in the when the franchise committee chair was a leader of the dirt farmers (R. C. Patty), who had gotten 61 votes to be President. The dirt farmers had begun the Convention a report stating “we are opposed to an educational or property qualification as applied to elections.”<sup>164</sup>

**Former Secretary of State James Hill.** James Hill is an obscure figure in the present, though there is a statue above his grave site within one hundred yards from the Masonic temple where Medgar Evers’ office was located, on a street named for John R. Lynch within a quarter mile of a street named for Montgomery. James Hill had been the Secretary of State when Adelbert Ames was Governor.

He had somehow to make his peace with the 1875 results in Warren County. In passing, Hill was the last Republican secretary of state until the incumbent. Hill remained in the state the rest of his life, though he engaged in fights with Bruce and others in Washington as to who would be regarded as the leader of the Mississippi Republicans.<sup>165</sup>

In January 1890, when the process of calling a convention was not yet through the legislature, Bruce was being reported in in the media as “formerly of Mississippi, now of the District of Columbia.”<sup>166</sup> This account from is supplemented by a report attributed to The Washington Bee. “For some time, James Hill, aided by someone behind the screen, has been making a fight against Messrs. Bruce and Lynch. The burden laid at Mr. Bruce’s door is that he is not a resident of the State [of Mississippi.]”<sup>167</sup>

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164

. Journal . . . , 50.

165

. Graham, op. cit. 56. .

166

. Ibid. 159.

167

This could occur because Republican presidential candidates needed support from Southern Black spokespersons who would attest to Northern Black voters who should be accounted as friendly. He continued as a Republican patronage manager, and did so at least unto the time that Mark Hanna ran McKinley's presidential campaign.<sup>168</sup>

Hill was also a close personal friend of Ida B. Wells, so close that he cooperated with her in bringing her face to face in a private setting with a minister who had lied, and had to apologize about stories he had circulated that she had been fired from school teaching for reason of personal morals.<sup>169</sup> Hill was known to Montgomery. They had done business with each other in getting the deal with the railroad for the land that became Mound Bayou. They had mutual friends. From all this, the inference has to be that if Hill disagreed with Montgomery at the time he did not choose to make it known.

### **Willis E. Mollison (1859-1924)**

Whereas Hill had held state-wide elective office, Willis E. Mollison had merely wanted to do so. Mollison (1859-1924), was to have been the Republican candidate for Secretary of State in 1889. He was born at Mayersville, Mississippi in Issaquena, on the north side of the Yazoo from Vicksburg.

This was the same county represented by the delegate, William Farish, who later led the floor challenge to seating Montgomery in the 1890 Convention. The newspaper account after Willis Mollison's passing claims that he worked on a farm, and "was taught how to read and write by a northern white lady, who became greatly interested in him." He had been sixteen in the year that Delegate Farish and others were riding about the county "waiting on people." It would also have made sense for a young Black man to take advantage and go to safer area for a time. Perhaps someone gave him advice, and even more at least a little money, since he left Mississippi and went north to Nashville to Fisk University. This was when he was about seventeen, in 1876.

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. Ibid.  
168

. Karl Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley  
169

. Paula J. Giddings, Ida: A Sword Among Lions, Paula J. Giddings, Ida: A Sword Among Lions, New York: Amistad, 208, 171.

He then entered Oberlin College,<sup>170</sup> a school with a notable Abolitionist history that Montgomery's sisters had attended just a few years before,<sup>171</sup> and that some other African Americans from the Deep South had attended.<sup>172</sup> Mollison spent about two years altogether in the two schools. The Chicago newspaper obituary is that he had to return to Mississippi in order to manage his mother's plantation.

In about two years, upon returning, he managed to read law under a Supreme Court judge (Jeffords), was admitted to the bar held various count-level appointments, and practiced widely in various civil matters. In 1889, he was thirty. This was the year before the Constitutional Convention. In 1889, he was to have been the Republican candidate for Secretary of State. The Republicans, out of armed harassment by the Democrats, virtually abandoned their campaign. If Mollison and his fellow Republicans could not feel secure enough to maintain their own state-wide campaign in 1889, what was Mollison say to Montgomery in 1890?

Mollison continued to live and practice law in Mississippi for more than twenty years, and some part of his practice included businesses in Mound Bayou. Willis Mollison was invited to speak at Alcorn in 1916, accepted with the condition that they buy two hundred copies of The Vicksburg Evening Post,<sup>173</sup> and his article that appeared in the manner of a public relations piece addressed to a white Mississippi audience. Mollison gives apparent praise to Vardaman for practical help to Alcorn's physical plant. "When he walked into the grounds one day and unannounced, saw students packing water, filling coal lamps, fuel being hauled for heat and cooking, directed that a water works be constructed, an electric light plant and a steam heating system be installed . . . and to this good day those who use these great conveniences bless the name of Vardaman."

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. There may be some account of African Americans from the Deep South who attended Oberlin in the 1870s.

<sup>171</sup> . Sterling (ed.), We Are Your Sisters as to Mary Virginia Montgomery and Rebecca Montgomery.

<sup>172</sup> . This is mentioned for some others in Beacon Lights of the Race and Beacon Lights of the Race.

<sup>173</sup> . Professor J. Janice Coleman located the relevant information and made it available to I

What is even more omitted, as one might expect in an obituary, was that two years after Mollison had appeared to praise Vardaman is that he was forced to leave Vicksburg under threat to his life.

According to Geoffrey Cowan, in the summer of 1918 one Dr. J. A. Miller (Williams College and the University of Michigan Medical School) was charged with sedition by a group of Vicksburg city leaders, “presumably for helping to organize a local chapter of the NAACP.” He “was tarred and feathered, and then ‘paraded through town, displayed near city hall, put in jail and finally banished under threat of death.’” Willis Mollison, William Attaway and W. P. Harrison “three other black ‘disloyalists,’ were all scheduled by the committee for tar and feathering,”<sup>174</sup> and so left Vicksburg.

Irvin C. Mollison, one of Willis Mollison’s seven children, wrote a pioneering study of African American lawyers in Mississippi.<sup>175</sup> The younger Mollison introduced the historical community to Samuel A. Beadle.

### Samuel A. Beadle (     ).

Samuel Beadle was presented to the court for a bar examination about 1884. The judge refused, on explicitly racist grounds that he would not examine a “nigger.” By whatever means, a lawyer named Anselm J. McLaurin – the last Confederate veteran to be elected governor in Mississippi– succeeding in getting the examination, which Beadle passed triumphantly. This willingness to sponsor a Black candidate for the bar—did not prevent McLaurin having a very successful political career. If white people objected to McLaurin’s favoring Beadle so much, not enough of them

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<sup>174</sup>. Cowan, citing McMillen, 30-32, and J. William Harris, *Deep Souths: Delta, Piedmont and Sea Island Society in the Age of Segregation*, 231

<sup>175</sup>

. Irvin C. Mollison, “Negro Lawyers in Mississippi,” *Journal of Negro History* (1930), which is the basis for the treatment of the same subject in J. Clay Smith, Jr, *Emancipation: The Making of the Black Lawyer, 1844-1944*,,

objected enough to prevent his being elected a delegate to the 1890 Convention (one of three brothers) who were delegates, nor to his becoming governor and United States senator.

Beadle was associated with the “black and tan” faction in Republican politics, and was one of the people squeezed out when Theodore Roosevelt decided that his Progressive party would have room only for the “lily whites.”<sup>176</sup> Although Beadle was sophisticated, professionally successful, and politically connected, the question is how he might have felt about dealing with Montgomery, or about what Montgomery had done in 1890.

In that period, did Beadle have a view of Montgomery? The geography and technology of the time allowed communication amongst them. It would have been virtually impossible for McLaurin (Beadle’s mentor) and Montgomery to have been in the Old Capitol for three and a half months in 1890, six years after Beadle was admitted to the bar, without either knowing something of the other. McLaurin had to decide on how to vote on whether Montgomery and Melchior should be seated or not, and he was one of those who abstained or was absent for the “yeas” and “nays.” He abstained.<sup>177</sup>

It would have been equally unlikely for Montgomery and Beadle to have spent their days, in the same three-and-a-half month period without knowing of each other. Would Beadle, and others with similar interests, have not known of Montgomery’s admonition against “repressive legislation which serves no good purpose, . . . enacted . . . to show a legal exception to color, . . . (places) the State in bad odor with leasing colored men, . . . and drives them from the State.”<sup>178</sup>

Beadle did not leave the state until later. He became very successful as a lawyer

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<sup>176</sup> . Geoffrey Cowan, LET THE PEOPLE RULE: Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of the Republican Presidential Primary New York: W.W. Norton, 2016.

<sup>177</sup> . Journal, 77.

<sup>178</sup> . Montgomery, What Answer? 30.

over the next twenty years. He was the lawyer for a cotton merchant in Jackson, J. B. Hart & Co. His son later wrote “As a retainer he received five hundred dollars a year and all his office expenses. He attended to their landed interests, handled their foreclosures, collected their accounts, drew their deeds, their contracts, and generally did all their commercial work.” In addition, he wrote the will for J. B. Hart, “involving a Million Dollars, and according to the last advices of Mr. Beadle, this will was still unchanged.”

But the circumstances were an indication of counter-emancipation. Under the influence of Vardaman-- the man who went into office on the slogan that the negroes did not need any education to fit them for their humble sphere ( The Vicksburg Post,) Beadle’s client was forced to let him go, on the ground that the job should be done by a white man and was beyond the status of a Black person.<sup>179</sup>

For Beadle and the others backward to Revels, we need some sense, and our evidence is not very good, as to what communication took place between the visible Black Mississippians and Isaiah T. Montgomery. They had multiple occasions to know him.<sup>180</sup> In 1890 he had to have had some place to eat sleep, some place for a haircut, and all the normal things of daily life. “Zie,” as some intimate must have known from his sister, “could we talk?”<sup>181</sup>

Their silence is puzzling. If he had refused to talk, that would have been good for the gossip mill. The evidence for that has not yet appeared. The mood of understanding Montgomery and respecting him, even in disagreement, shifted absolutely with the testimony of Sidney D. Redmond.

Sidney D. Redmond ( 1871-1948?)

Sidney D. Redmond would have been 19 years old in 1890. But the attitude he formed would seem to have been that of a 19 year old who wanted a 43 year old to be defiant. A person of considerable energy and drive he attended medical school, then

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<sup>179</sup> . Irvin C. Mollison, op. cit.

<sup>180</sup>

.Hamilton, Beacon Lights of the Race 432-433 and generally.

<sup>181</sup> . “Zie” is how Mary Virginia referred to him in her diaries as reproduced in Sterling, op. cit.

became a lawyer when, according to his son, his own health made medical practice too hard for him,<sup>182</sup> and he then became a successful entrepreneur. The attitude would seem to have remained with him as the years went on until he came to the point where he gave voice to it.

In those later years he was also an active Republican politician, State Chairman at the same time that Montgomery's daughter was the National Committeewoman. V. O. Key has nothing of substance about his politics, though citing Redmond's estate as having been probated at \$808,000 (?)<sup>183</sup> which is equivalent to more than \$20 million at 2014 price levels. But his political view, more caustic than that of Frederick Douglass, mixed in with the Lynch recital, has since become the standard 21<sup>st</sup> century interpretation of Montgomery in 1890,<sup>184</sup> came into scholarly literature, unquestionably published by the Bunche memorandum, was accepted also in the civil rights movement and amongst some African American legislators.

A Mississippi Black legislator informed me of having received such harsh criticism from other Black legislators that this legislator copied portions of Holden's writing into the desk in order to be able to respond quickly in debate. Within the years since 2006, the Mississippi Department of Archives and History displayed a video of portions of Montgomery's speech being read, and political sensitivities were such that the reading role was assigned to a professional actor.

We do not know when the African American attitude generally shifted. Redmond's attitude was expressed in sources that the African American literati, further mentioned below, would easily know at the time of Ralph Bunche's studies for Gunnar

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<sup>182</sup> . Interview, op. cit., with Sidney R. Redmond, Oral History T-0025, Interviewed by Dr. Richard Resh and Franklin Rother, Black Community Leaders Project, July 6. 1970, Transcript. [Oral History Collection \(S0829\)](#), [The State Historical Society of Missouri.](#), [shsresearch@umsystem.edu](mailto:shsresearch@umsystem.edu).

<sup>183</sup>

. Ralph J. Bunche, The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR, Edited with an introduction by Dewey W. Grantham, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, 436.

<sup>184</sup> . See reference to comment by Professor Charles Kenyatta Rice at note xxx.

Myrdal. This was as of World War II, when told an interviewer working for Ralph J. Bunche, “there is one Negro who will be remembered in future histories as the Judas of his people.” Redmond did not mince words. “The Negro was Isaiah T. Montgomery, from Mound Bayou.” The reason that Redmond gave was that “Montgomery betrayed his people by voting for Section 240 of the infamous Constitution of 1890 which wiped out the political liberties of the Negro people and the vast masses of white people.” He went on to tell the interviewer that “Montgomery was lionized and acclaimed by the Bourbons for this betrayal.”

Other Marginal Persons: Ida B. Wells-Barnett (1862-1931) and Buck Colbert Franklin ( )

In contrast to the unlimited denunciation of Redmond, the best evidence on favorable attitudes that Montgomery’s contemporaries held comes, in my view, from Ida B. Wells-Barnett. Ida B. Wells-Barnett was as close in time as was Montgomery himself. Her particular worth here is that she was always unrelenting in her criticism of those with whom she disagreed. At that time, she was a young woman in her twenties, publishing a weekly newspaper in Memphis. Wells, in 1931 when Montgomery had been dead seven years, said that she had criticized him severely in her paper in 1890. He made the trip to Memphis to see her, and explain his position. She said she had never agreed with what he had done. Nonetheless, “we became the best of friends, and he helped to increase the circulation of the paper wonderfully by sending me all through the Delta.” [..]

In addition to Wells-Barnett, there is the eulogistic praise that almost certainly had the approval of Montgomery himself. Green Polonius Hamilton in 1911 said Montgomery’s speech “in the Constitutional Convention against the abrogation of the Negro’s political rights was one of the most masterly efforts that ever was delivered in the State of Mississippi, and electrified the whole nation.”<sup>185</sup>

Further said Hamilton, Montgomery’s “impassioned plea for moderation in dealing with the people of his race, was couched in language as appropriate as it was elegant and diplomatic.”<sup>186</sup> This plea, Hamilton continues “did not prevent the passage of the plank that was hostile to the suffrage of the race, but the conciliatory spirit that it breathed did much to soften the asperities that were the result of its enactment.”<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> . G. P. Hamilton, Beacon Lights of the Race, Memphis: P. H. Clarke and Brother, 1911, “Isaiah T. Montgomery, Mound Bayou, Miss.,” 283.

<sup>186</sup> . Hamilton, Beacon Lights of the Race

<sup>187</sup>

. Ross, conversation, as cited above,

Methodologically, it is imperative to notice that Hamilton traveled from place in collecting material, though the continued praise of his subjects, in each case, shows that he withheld the critical evaluation that would normally be expected. One should also note that the book was intended to show material to inspire Black young men against the onslaught on hostile material found in the mass media and in educational material.<sup>188</sup>

As a matter of argument, I emphasize that Hamilton's version appears more consistent with the situation than the recent expression of a newer historian that Isaiah T. Montgomery delivered "an impassioned plea" for the disfranchisement of his people.

Finally, one should mention Buck Colbert Franklin. Buck Colbert Franklin was a younger man, having been born in 1879. An Oklahoma attorney, Franklin was a boy in 1890 and makes no claim of having studied what Montgomery did in 1890. But he knew Montgomery later, and was married April 1, 1903 in Montgomery's living room, wrote years after of "the great Isaiah Montgomery."<sup>189</sup> That is the language of respect.

Group 3 was the Black literati who favored militancy and detested accommodating white assertions of superiority, and whose interpretation comes from Saunders Redding. This set of educated African American commentators are harder to identify except generally they were intellectuals who became quite ready for the denunciation from Redmond and from the civil rights era leader mentioned by Charles Kenyatta Ross.<sup>190</sup> They were more 20<sup>th</sup> century people have an attitude that would result from the combined accounts attributed to Lynch and to Redmond, as further restated by

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<sup>188</sup> . In this respect, Hamilton's compilation is somewhat similar to the earlier William J. Simmons, Men of Mark: Eminent, Progressive, Rising, published in 1887, the same year that Montgomery moved to Bolivar County. The book was republished n.p?, Ebony Classics, 1970, edited by Lerone Bennett.

<sup>189</sup>

. Buck Colbert Franklin, My Life and an Era: The Autobiography of Buck Colbert Franklin, Edited by John Hope Franklin and John Whittingham Franklin, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997,126.

<sup>190</sup>

. Above, p. .

Saunders Redding, and then by George Sewell and Margaret L. Dwight.

There are some lucid passages in by Saunders Redding (1973). Redding was a highly capable African American scholar, known to the small community of African American scholars in the 1940s. It is likely, to judge from book review citations, that it may have been particularly influential with African American scholars at that time. Redding's interpretations are brilliantly written and consistent with what African Americans might then have wished to read. But they also seem utterly unreliable. For example, it cites exact quotations about family conferences in kitchens, and Redding reports such conferences in the late 1860s as if a stenographer had been there.<sup>191</sup>

The materials appear to be based upon interviews that Redding had in Mound Bayou some time after 1938, since he refers to some deaths that occurred in 1938. The book contains material about conversations, personalities, and relations between Montgomery and his cousin, Benjamin T. Green, that are significantly negative about Montgomery and favorable to Green or Green's widow.<sup>192</sup>

Redding, as is often the mode of litterateurs, spoke strongly does not seem careful about giving the reader any idea of the quality of his evidence.<sup>193</sup> All one can read from his material is that he is anti-Montgomery and frames his evidence smoothly. The best one can guess is that someone told him something that allowed him to formulate a "narrative."

Sewell and Dwight say that "Montgomery's vote helped George and the Democrats elect the temporary chairman, thus gaining control of the convention for the Democrats."<sup>194</sup>

. There was not. As editors of an encyclopedic work, Sewell and Dwight were at the mercy of their sources, but they were wrong in what they took.

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<sup>191</sup>

. Redding, 79-80.

<sup>192</sup>

. MH/MSS/Green' Draft Note on Mrs. Eva P. Green Francis

<sup>193</sup> . Robert E. Lane, The Liberties of Wit, New Haven: Yale University Press, 196X

<sup>194</sup> . George Sewell and Margaret Dwight, 1984, 162, Rev. and Enl...

All we know is that Lynch says he made the wrong decision.

This review of the situations, expressions, and attitudes of African American commentators as they shaped and reshaped the reputation of Isaiah T. Montgomery over time. Sewell and Dwight stand, by my account, as examples of the 20th century Black literati, preceded by the Mississippi Black elite who went silent for a time, and they in turn preceded by the Northern and urban contemporaries of Montgomery give a basis for considering the claim that Montgomery sold out.

These claims take us back to the core issue of political strategies under extreme adversity. They also take us to the question of Montgomery's success or failure and to his own concept of his situation, and then to the question of what remains for political science.

## VI

### The Montgomery Failure and Montgomery's Afterthoughts

If Montgomery in the end did not reveal the sense of failure, he surely revealed delicately a sense of concern that came close to admitting, in so many words, that his 1890 strategy, as expressed in the speech, had not worked.

The problem, though Montgomery just barely touched upon it, was in the lack of capacity to enforce a political deal. In the same period, Isaiah Montgomery continued to correspond with Booker T. Washington reciting the privations imposed upon enterprising Black people. In he wrote a paper for the 1910 paper reunion of surviving delegates, saying that the race problem had been removed from politics forever.

This was so patently economical with the truth, Vardaman and Bilbo both being on the rise. It also points to the defect of the Redmond criticism. Redmond's moral evaluation should, if it is to be judged logically, be analysed in its own moral terms. But in political terms –which is the center of this paper—it is defective, and so is the common understanding that came in Redmond's time.

The 1890 Constitution did indeed provide a method, by re-registration, by which ninety per cent pf the Black electors were removed through extraordinary administrative discretion in the hands of county officials. The 1890 Constitution actually left sufficient latitude that the white poor became the political resource of the ambitious politicians who were the most antagonistic political leaders.

What counted most was private discretion to control Blacks by force and threat of

force. The many thousands of Blacks that Frank Montgomery said could “if they would, qualify themselves to vote, and would certainly hold the balance of power” did not do because were threatened with force or subjected to force.

Except for the first re-registration, which was severely damaging, Section 240, which allowed harsh administrative discretion about who could vote, did not do what Redmond said.

It did not come into action until after World War II, when the Black movement to vote became the immediate predecessor to the civil rights movement starting in the 1950s.

All this suggests that there is an opportunity for some political scientist or historian to conduct a detailed analysis of the challenge and the vote on dealing with it.<sup>195</sup>

In 1923 Montgomery gave a speech—his last so far I have found—in which he had to come back to the racial problem. He referred to his 1890 convention speech thirty three years before. “I pictured then that if our new compact, our new constitution, in its administration, failed to be true and just in taking into proper account the race with which I was identified, then the silent conflict would still go on, affecting every phase of his varied occupations.”

But Montgomery was dead as of 1924.<sup>196</sup> In that speech, he said that he had made a proposal and asked if there would be a friendly counter-proposal. Within Mississippi there was not. The silent conflict did still go on, and the white supremacy –the absolute veto of equality, public and private – was reasserted as the public norm at least to the 1960s.

This leaves the tough intellectual problems, and practical ones for scholars of power, African American and otherwise, who have yet to refresh the generic question of political strategies under extreme adversity.

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<sup>195</sup> . Rednecks, Redeemers, and Race: Mississippi After Reconstruction, 1877-1917, Jackson: University Press of Mississippi for the Mississippi Historical Society, 2006, 114, n. 12.

<sup>196</sup> . Mound Bayou, the town of which he was principal founder, was all that was left and is cited from time to time even in this century. That, however, is a separate subject to which Matthew Holden, Jr. may devote attention at another time.

Recapitulation and arguable lessons to be learned or trial run hypotheses to be derived:  
The Problem of Domestic Peacemaking under Extreme Adversity

We recapitulate by recalling the principle, from Aaron Wildavsky and L.C. Dorsey, that what the young should be taught is fundamental. This applied to “the young” of any group –Black, white, or any other group. It is a reasoned guess that the young– whether K-12 or college and graduate school, the faculties who teach them, the employers who hire them, the investors who finance them, or the audiences who buy what they offer—whether in Mississippi or far beyond, have never been taught the Isaiah T. Montgomery speech, its circumstances, or its consequences.<sup>197</sup>

So we begin with the reputation of Isaiah T. Montgomery. Reputation is political currency and gains credence only if it is circulated by people who are believed.

Whenever a group in power shall have encountered defeat, those who have won must know that counter-attack will come.

Political strategy involves choice, not just accidental behavior. The task of the representative of a subordinated group, such as the African Americans in late 19<sup>th</sup> century, and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, America is to maximize opportunity, certainly to find means to minimize impending damage and to pay the price of bitter criticism if there is failure.

Montgomery got to the Convention, was challenged and the challenge was overridden. Whose action produced the result has never yet been explained.

The next step forces us into trying to comprehend what Montgomery did or failed to do. The speech involves strategy, not just accidental behavior.

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<sup>197</sup> . This sentence is written so as to include each of several generational or functional groups that knows, or needs to know, something about the past conditions that contribute to present or future conditions. It is already obvious that except for the most diligent or committed students the “millennials” neither know or care much, having other concerns, until some situation forces it upon them. Sheila Marikar, “On the Campaign Trail/Creator in Chief,” The New Yorker, July 11 & 18, 2016, 28-29.

The problem in strategy is whether the person (or group) has wider or narrower choices, whether those who are represented can follow, will follow or have to follow, and whether the adversaries can concede, will concede, or have to concede something that is important.<sup>198</sup> The degree of adversity is the key.

Montgomery's formulation approximated the idea of a constitution for the governance of divided societies. It only made sense if one accepted the idea that the white supremacy constitution could turn over time into a constitution that allowed successful Black progress in coexistence along with a guarantee of white advantage.

Proposition 1: Dominating groups show little tendency to stop dominating, but reciprocity between groups does not

1a: What is the better theory, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, that predict some lowering of demand from the politicians seeking office ("from the hustings"); the mass media ("the public press"), the sources of higher learning and its diffusion ("the lecture platform"), and the accepted interpreters of public morality (the preachers in "the pulpit")?

Proposition 2: Subordinated groups expect their spokespersons (or leaders) to meet to find means out of the wilderness of extreme adversity.

Proposition 3: Denunciation is a tool that such groups use against leaders who have not satisfied them, even if those leaders are dead and gone.

Proposition 4: The hard task for political scientists is to forecast when and why the hostile will become still more hostile, rather than in mitigating the hostility.

Specification: What would the political careers of Vardaman and Bilbo have become if the post-1890 numbers expressed in Montgomery's speech been sustained? As a matter of theory,

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<sup>198</sup> . In this I am influenced by recent communication with Steven Teles in which he reinforced in the idea that a more systematic analysis of "strategy" would be desirable. There just is not sufficient time to reframe this manuscript, especially in light of other things (such as the history and structure of Bolivar County politics and the turbulent politics of 1865-1890) which are now to be found in what political scientists can be assumed to know.

could this counterfactual have ever been attained?

Proposition 5: In this 21<sup>st</sup> century age of methodology, a number of issues present themselves as to what data sources and usable methods for knowledge will show white Mississippians' attitudes and transactions?

Specification: Was Redmond's claim that Montgomery was "lionized" for what he described as "betrayal" valid?

Proposition 6: The militarized conditions from 1875, going 1880s, going into the year 1890, produced a strategic tendency for African Americans in potential leadership roles to become more and more quiescent.

6a: What questions would theoretical political science or political science method provoke and thereby create some data that we do not presently have?

For example, some forms of simulation, might arguably be useful in education in the present world. As a contemporary example, the question might be restated as how would Oberlin students of 2016 deal with the experience recited in this paper?<sup>199</sup>

Query: If students were assigned the Montgomery role, what would we expect the student playing Montgomery to do?<sup>200</sup>

(d) College students in 2016 were probably born and brought up in the world since 1994 thereabouts. So if the 1890 situation were taught as a case study, how would we predict student case-writers to frame the Montgomery problem?

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199

. Nathan Heller, "Letter from Oberlin/The Big Uneasy/What's roiling the liberal-arts campus?" The New Yorker, May 30, 2016, 48-57.

200

. Matthew Holden, Jr., "The Competence of Political Science: 'Progress in Political Research' Revisited," American Political Science Review 90:1 (2000). 1-19.

(g) What political science theory or political science method would adequately reproduce what we already know, including the fact that the Obama Presidency embodies the end of white supremacy?

(g)1: But how can political scientists, best interpret an empirical theory of “the post-racial” society, not a moral theory of what ought to be, but an empirical theory of how what ought to be can be achieved?<sup>201</sup>

Proposition 7: Demography and economics produce multi-racial polities, and the multi-racial or multi-ethnic economies, so that most countries in the world face the challenges of the Montgomery problem.

The propositions just stated lead us to the key issue that one may state as “domestic peacemaking.” The \_\_\_\_\_ . It leaves the issue of what it takes—theoretically—for multiple groups to live in amity in the same political system.<sup>202</sup>

This can be restated as “democracy” or some form of majority rule, “constitutionalism” or some form of regularized restraint in the exercise of power, and “reciprocity” or some form of acceptance in group A of the legitimacy of group B. This was never yet attained in Mississippi post-Montgomery.

Part of the question is whether domestic peacemaking, or racial reconciliation if that is the preferred term, has a connection to whether “transitional justice” ever has occurred.

(a) In 2016, there is no apparent reciprocity at leadership levels on the question of Confederate flag

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. Charles P. Henry, Robert L. Allen & Robert Chrisman (eds.) The Obama Phenomenon: Toward a Multiracial Democracy, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1912

<sup>202</sup> . Perhaps the most frightening experience is that emancipation can be followed by counter-emancipation, which is that of Jewish emancipation in 19<sup>th</sup> century and how it followed in early 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe.

symbolism, for instance.

- (b) Nor is it apparent that “group interest,”<sup>203</sup> which political science for at least ninety-plus years had deemed crucial, cuts across racial-partisan splits in legislation, nor is it apparent that inter-urban or metropolitan-area diplomacy cuts across racial divisiveness to a significant degree.<sup>204</sup>

Peacemaking in international relations is mainly a process in which designated negotiators work through the formal terms in which the representatives of A and B come to agreements that they can mutually enforce upon their followings. But there is also the question of achieving underlying attitudes such that both communities accept the need for reciprocity with the other.

The quest for reciprocity –stated such a term as “racial reconciliation”—is nowhere near being achieved in 21<sup>st</sup> century Mississippi.

“Institutional” devices for “domestic peacemaking,” if one may so designate this process is not yet much studied in political science and related fields. Psychological theories for the same end are even less seriously pursued.

In principle, there are a variety of means by which it could be approximated. For example, where state offices are subject to popular election, it is perfectly possible to nominate candidates of the same social description – the evasive 21<sup>st</sup> century term is “demographic”—and in Mississippi this almost always means “race.”

The reach of the question of domestic peacemaking, of the creation of attitudes that will permit reciprocity, and of institutions that will sustain rather than undermine it, in principle, extends anew to Britain and Western Europe.

The social need for domestic peacemaking is so well known that we have only to mention the problem of conflict in Ireland from the 19<sup>th</sup> century through the First World War, and the protracted struggle in Northern Ireland until the Good Friday Agreement.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> .

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. Matthew Holden, Jr., “The Governance of the Metropolis as a Problem in Diplomacy,” Journal of Politics 26:3 (August 1964), 627-647.

<sup>205</sup> . George J. Mitchell, The Negotiator, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015,

In October 2013, it appeared by casual observation of “peace walls” in Belfast of cement blocks, steel posts, and wire, along with movable gates that the police close on Falls Road and Shankill Avenue at night. The unstructured observer (the present author), in Belfast for completely separate purposes,<sup>206</sup> saw some of this, and by sheer accident met a graduate student with plans to visit the Winter Institute at the University of Mississippi.

The problem of domestic peacemaking was similarly present in the language conflict in Belgium,<sup>207</sup> and the issue of Muslims in democratic India who –oddly like Black Americans—have high presence only in entertainment and athletics. The exclusion of Muslims also reaches into the military services and the police. “An unrepresentative force makes the state a lot less legitimate for those unrepresented in its most obvious instrument of coercion.”<sup>208</sup>

There are other manifestations of inter-sect conflicts in the Arab Muslim world, and of various language and cultural groups in sub-Saharan Africa, and all the way to Australia.

These all are manifestations of the Montgomery problem of how to discover a better form of constitution than most political systems have managed. In this need to contribute to serious study of the problem that Isaiah T. Montgomery sought to meet, a good deal of dead dog clearing yet remains. Or, if one gives credit as even Frederick Douglass sought, then to study action taken with serious intention, it hard intellectually to look back at that action that has been so savaged and misinterpreted.

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239-256.

<sup>206</sup> . At the time, I had not retired from the University of Illinois at Springfield and was visiting Queen’s University as part of my duties.

<sup>207</sup> . Holden, Continuity & Disruption, Chapter 8, “Public Administration and the Plural Society,” at 220-230.

<sup>208</sup> . Arvind Verma. Review of Khalidi, Omar, Khaki and the Ethnic Violence in India: Armed Forces, Police, and Paramilitary Forces during Communal Riots. H-Asia, H-Net Reviews. April, 2011), which should also be discussed in relation to Holden, Continuity & Disruption, Chapter 8, “Public Administration and the Plural Society,” at 220-227 on “Administration and Force: ‘Armed Bureaucracies.’”